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Chapter I. 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Introduction - Navigable waterways were once 
among the primary arteries of transportation and commerce. 
A substantial body of law developed in New York to help as- 
sure that rivers and streams would be accessible to perform 
this important public role. Today, the public's navigation use 
of streams is mainly recreational. This recreational use is val- 
uable, however, not merely as an amenity enhancing the qual- 
ity of life, but it also can be an important tourism resource 
and economic benefit to many areas of the state. The laws 
that regulate the public's right to pass over the state's naviga- 
ble waterways have, therefore, acquired a renewed 
importance. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, a practice de- 
veloped among many riparian landowners to close off public 
access to smaller streams that had previously been open for 
public use. This occurred despite the fact that New York's 
statutory and case law have adhered consistently to the tradi- 
tional common-law rule which entitles members of the public 
to navigate upon all streams susceptible to such use. The very 
persistence of the stream closing practices, however, raised 
ambiguities in the popular perception concerning the public's 
actual right to navigate through privately-owned lands. 
1.1. Approach and Scope - This paper provides a 
comprehensive survey of the New York judicial decisions 
bearing on the public's right to use the state's navigable 
streams and waterways. The cases have been organized into. a 
logical framework, in outline form, in order to give future re- 
searchers ready access to the relevant judicial materials. 
Wherever possible, the main thrust of the cases has been 
presented in the court's own words.' Brief narrative summa- 
ries of the case law are provided under the main outline head- 
ings. An attempt has been made to include a reference to 
1. In quoting passages from the cases, italics have frequently been added to 
highlight key words and phrases. 
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every New York case relevant to public use of freshwater 
streams, along with a full and representative sample of cases 
involving lakes and tidal waters. 
Federal decisions are cited sparingly. Except where they 
specifically involve New York law, most Federal decisions on 
navigation are, a t  best, indirectly relevant to an understand- 
ing of the common law rules that apply in New York. To  be 
sure, congressional legislation could have a singularly major 
impact on the rights of the public, or anyone else, to use New 
York's waterways, but "until Congress intervenes in such 
cases and exercises its authority, the power of the States is 
plenary." Hamilton u. Vicksburg, S. & P. R.R., 119 U.S. 280, 
281 (1886). 
The New York cases on the public use of tidal waters are 
far more numerous than those which consider public rights in 
freshwater streams. Even though fresh and tidal waters are 
subject to very different rules in questions of ownership, New 
York courts have consistently "made no distinction against 
the public right of passage and transportation." Fulton Light , 
Heat & Power Co. u. New York, 200 N.Y. 400, 412, 94 N.E. 
199, 202 (1911) (emphasis added). The courts themselves tend 
to cite freshwater and tidal water cases indiscriminantly as 
authorities for one another, especially in reference to the pub- 
lic right of passage. Because tidal water cases add reinforce- 
ment and useful elucidation of the lines of freshwater hold- 
ings, frequent references to tidal water cases have been 
essential in order to present a complete picture of the New 
York common law applicable to the fresh waters of the state. 
1.2. Summary and Conclusions - The beds of New 
York's freshwater streams are generally privately owned, but 
the courts have always recognized that the private ownership 
of underwater land is subject to a public right of passage 
along any streams that are "navigable in fact". The cases de- 
clare that the public right is an "easement" to use streams as 
a "highway", and they do not limit the public use to any par- 
ticular purpose (such as commercial transport). When stream- 
side owners act unilaterally to forbid public passage along 
navigable streams, they violate the state's long-established 
property interest in the stream, an interest held by the state 
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under a public trust for the benefit of the People. 
The Legislature has the power to declare that any stream 
is a public highway for general use. Compensation must be 
paid to the private streambed owners only if the stream is not 
"navigable in fact". No compensation is required if the Legis- 
lature merely reaffirms the public's long-standing right of pas- 
sage (and reasonably necessary incidental rights, such as 
anchoring) on the state's actually navigable streams. To ratify 
the public's historic rights of passage would impose no new 
legal burden on landowners; it only reaffirms a right or "ease- 
ment" which the state has owned, in trust, all along. 
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Chapter 11. 
THE CONCEPT OF "NAVIGABILITY" 
2. The Concept of "Navigability" - What counts as 
"navigable" waters for various legal purposes can vary consid- 
erably depending on the context. As the united States Su- 
preme Court has observed, "any reliance upon judicial prece- 
dent must be predicated upon a careful appraisal of the 
purpose for which the concept of 'navigability' was invoked in 
a particular case." Kaiser Aetna v. United States,  444 U.S. 
164, 171 (1979). 
2.1 The Kinds of "Navigability" - A number of dif- 
ferent definitions of "navigability" are recognized in New 
York, federal and other United States cases. Each of these 
definitions is applicable for a different purpose, for example, 
determining United States admiralty jurisdiction, fixing the 
reach of the federal commerce power, delimiting the so-called 
navigation servitude exception to the Constitution's takings 
clause, construing federal grants of riparian lands, interpret- 
ing state or pre-Revolution royal grants of riparian lands, and 
establishing the public's right of passage under state law. See 
Johnson & Austin, Recreational Rights and Tit les  t o  Beds o n  
Western Lakes and Streams,  7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1967); 
Annotation, Public Rights o f  Recreational Boating, Fishing, 
Wading, or the  Like in Inland Stream the  Bed of Which is 
Privately Owned, 6 A.L.R.4th 1030 (1981). 
The two navigability concepts that play a key role in the 
New York cases are: 
a. Navigability in law, which is based on the English 
common-law definition of navigable waters, i.e., those 
which are tidal. 
b. Navigability in fact,  which is based on the waters' ac- 
tual capacity for transportation and commerce by boats, 
rafts, floating logs, etc. 
2.2 Navigability in Law - In New York, the concept 
of navigability in law is used chiefly to determine the owner- 
ship of underwater lands. In general, lands under waters that 
are navigable in law are presumed to have been retained by 
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the state (or king) when the original grants of the water-side 
lands were made - unless, of course, a grant of such under- 
water lands was clearly intended. (For lands under waters 
that are not navigable in law, the opposite presumption is 
made, uiz. that such underwater lands belong to the adjacent 
upland owners. See infra Chapter 111.) 
Since Chancellor Kent's seminal dictum in Palmer u. 
Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 308,318a-19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (Hudson 
a t  Stillwater [fresh and non-tidal]), New York cases have gen- 
erally followed the English precedents and have defined navi- 
gability in law to mean only those waters that are subject to 
the ebb and flow of the tides. In accordance with this princi- 
ple, most lands under tidal waters, including the tidal portion 
of the Hudson River, are owned by the state; most lands 
under the state's fresh waters are owned privately. 
There is, incidentally, ample indication that Chancellor 
Kent may have applied the English common law incorrectly 
and that, in England, any water that was navigable in fact 
was also navigable in law. See Waterford Elec. Light, Heat & 
Power Co. u. New York, 208 A.D. 273, 275-76, 203 N.Y.S. 858, 
861-62 (3d Dept. 1924), aff'd, 239 N.Y. 629, 147 N.E. 225 
(1925) (Hudson at  Van Schoenhoven rapids). Right or wrong, 
however, Chancellor Kent's version of things "is now firmly 
established in this State." Id. a t  208 A.D. 281, 203 N.Y.S. 866. 
In Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. u. New York, 200 
N.Y. 400, 412, 94 N.E. 199, 202 (1911) (Oswego River), the 
court wrote: 
In  law, the term 'navigable river' has received a technical 
application to rivers, or arms of the sea, in which the tide 
ebbs and pows. The common law of England regarded all 
fresh water rivers as non-navigable . . . . The navigability, 
in fact, of a stream had no relevancy to the question of 
the title to the bed; it was relevant solely to the public 
right to pass, or to transport, upon as upon a highway 
(emphasis added). 
In Smith u. Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 479 (1883) (Hemlock 
Lake), the court approvingly quoted an extensive footnote to 
Ex parte Jennings, 6 Cow. 518, 543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826) to 
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the effect that: "Rivers not navigable, that is fresh waters of 
what kind soever, do of common right belong to the owners of 
the soii adjacent to the extent of their land in length." 
In People u. Tibbetts, 19 N.Y. 523, 526 (1859), i t  was said: 
"If the Hudson was . . . a navigable stream a t  Troy, . . . then i t  
was t h e  property of the people. A river is considered as an 
arm of the sea, and as such navigable, so far as the tide rises 
and falls. That is a technical rule of early establishment . . . ." 
(emphasis added). Incidentally, the fact that the water might 
be fresh would not prevent it from being navigable in law pro- 
vided that the requisite tidal influence was present. Id. 
In Ex parte Jennings, 6 Cow. 518, 528 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1826), the court wrote: 
By the term navigable river, the law does not mean such 
as is navigable in common parlance. The smallest creek 
may be so [navigable] to a certain extent, as well as the 
largest river, without being legally a navigable stream. 
The term has in law a technical meaning; and applies to 
all streams, rivers or arms of the sea, where the tide ebbs 
and flows (emphasis added). 
See also State u. Bishop, 46 A.D.2d 654, 359 N.Y.S.2d 
817, 820 (2d Dept. 1974). Referring to marshlands a t  the edge 
of Moriches Bay (tidal), the court observed that: "[Wlaters, 
though not navigable in fact are deemed navigable in law 
when they are shallow reaches of navigable bodies. Over such 
waters the power of the State extends." 
But cf.: A few twentieth century cases have held that 
"[nlavigability in fact is the test of navigability in law." Peo- 
ple ex rel. New York Cent. R.R. u. State Tax Comm'n, 258 
A.D. 356, 360, 16 N.Y.S.2d 812, 817 (3d Dept. 1940), aff'd, 284 
N.Y. 616, 29 N.E.2d 932 (1940) (citations omitted) (small 
Hudson tributaries of Iona Bay, Doodletown Creek, and Po- 
polopen Creek are navigable in fact), citing cases from the 
United States Supreme Court; City of Albany u. State, 71 
Misc. 2d 294, 297, 335 N.Y.S.2d 975, 979 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1972) 
(dictum); Findley Lake Property Owners, Inc. u. Town of 
Mina, 31 Misc. 2d 356, 378, 154 N.Y.S.2d 775, 796 (N.Y. Sup. 
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Ct. 1956); Board of Hudson River Requlating Dist. u. Fonda, 
J. & G.R. Co., 223 A.D. 358, 360, 228 N.Y.S. 686, 688 (3d 
Dept. 1928), modified on other grounds, 249 N.Y. 445 t1928); 
People ex rel. New York, 0. & W. Ry. u. State Tax Comm'n, 
116 Misc. 774, 775, 191 N.Y.S. 464, 466 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921) 
(Susquehanna River: "The test of navigability in law, is navi- 
gability in fact"). There is not, however, clear twentieth cen- 
tury authority for applying this rule (which is the federal rule 
and the majority American rule) in New York. 
2.3 Navigability in Fact - Even if the bed of a 
stream or lake is in private ownership, the public still has a 
right of passage, as on a highway, if the stream or lake is navi- 
gable in fact. See infra 5 4.3. This navigability in fact test is 
entirely distinct from the ebb-and-flow test of navigability in 
law. Navigability in fact means essentially what i t  says, and 
the determinations of navigability in fact are, of course, fact- 
bound determinations. A variety of definitional criteria are 
presented by the cases. 
2.3.1. The Landmark New York Case - on naviga- 
bility in  fact is Morgan u. King, 35 N.Y. 454, 458-59 (1866), in 
which the New York Court of Appeals (Court of Appeals) 
wrote: 
By the common law of England, . . . a river is, in fact, 
navigable, on which boats, lighters or rafts may be floated 
to market . . . . [However,] the rule of the common law, as 
to what degree of capacity renders a river navigable, in 
fact, should be received, in this country, with such modifi- 
cations as will adapt it to the peculiar character of our 
streams and the commerce for which they may be used . . 
. . [W]e have many streams, of considerable extent, not 
navigable by boats, lighters or rafts, but capable of float- 
ing to market single logs'or sticks of timber . . . . The true 
rule is, that the public have a right of way in every stream 
which is capable, in its natural state and its ordinary 
volume of water, of transporting, in a condition fit for 
market, the products of the forests or mines, or of the till- 
age of the soil upon its banks (emphasis added). 
The Court of Appeals added that, to support the public right 
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of way, it is not essential that: 
- the property to be transported be carried in vessels (i.e., 
a capacity to float logs is sufficient)'; 
- the stream be navigable both against as well as with the 
current; or 
- the navigation capacity be continuous, viz. in all seasons 
of the year. Id. a t  499. 
"If it is so far navigable or floatable, in its natural state and 
its ordinary capacity, as to be of public use in the transporta- 
tion of property, the public claim to such use ought to be lib- 
erally supported." Id. (emphasis added). 
Despite the breadth of its definition of navigable in fact, 
the Court of Appeals in Morgan v. King declined to hold that 
the Racquette River between Colton and Raymondsville was a 
public highway. Id. a t  460. In reaching that conclusion, the 
court pointed to three factors: (1) the stream, in its natural 
state, "was not capable of floating even single logs, except 
during seasons of high-water, which were about two months in 
a year," and, even then, the logs could not go down unassisted 
or, for that matter, undamaged; (2) the stream had become 
useful for transport only because the Legislature had provided 
funds for "artificial improvements"; and (3) the Legislature 
had provided that persons using the river for log transport 
should pay the pre-existing dam owners for "such damages as 
he or they might sustain" in altering the existing dams and 
booms, but plaintiff was instead trying to force the dam alter- 
ations without paying. Id. a t  460-61. 
It  is perhaps also notable that, according to the court, the 
relevant section of the Racquette River "was not capable, a t  
any season, of being navigated by vessels, barges, lighters or 
rafts." Id. at  456 (emphasis added). 
2.3.2. Definitions Based on Commercial Use - 
The potential of a stream for use in commerce has been re- 
peatedly cited in New York as a basis for finding the stream 
to be navigable in fact, beginning with the landmark case of 
Morgan v. King, 35 N.Y. 453, 458-59 (1866) ("capable . . . of 
transporting [products] in a condition fit for market"). 
In Sawczyk v. United States Coast Guard, 499 F. Supp. 
1034, 1039 (W.D.N.Y. 1980), the Falls-to-Lewiston reach of 
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the Niagara River was found navigable in fact (and thus sub- 
ject to United States admiralty jurisdiction) based in part on 
commercial use in the form of regularly operated raft trips 
(apparently recreational), stating that "the raft venture at  is- 
sue in these cases evidences the continuing effort to exploit 
the river commercially." The court added, "[ilt is not neces- 
sary that a waterway now be open and used commercially, if it 
is susceptible of being used for transport and commerce 
whatever the modes may be." Id. at  1040. 
"[The bank is] a channel for useful commerce of a sub- 
stantial and permanent character . . . ." People v. Waite, 103 
Misc. 2d 204, 207, 425 N.Y.S.2d 462, 464 (St. Law. County Ct. 
1979). 
"[A] waterway is navigable in fact only when it is used, or 
susceptible.of being used, in its natural and ordinary condi- 
tion (emphasis in original), as a highway for commerce . . . . 
(emphasis added)" Thornhill u. Skidmore, 32 Misc. 2d 320, 
323, 227 N.Y.S.2d 793, 796 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961). 
In Fairchild u. Kraemer, 11 A.D.2d 232, 235, 204 
N.Y.S.2d 823, 825-26 (2d Dept. 1960), after stating that the 
ebb-aad-flow test does not apply, the court said that "a water- 
way is navigable in fact only when it is used, or susceptible of 
beingused, in its natural and ordinary condition, as a highway 
for commerce over which trade and travel are or may be con- 
ducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water." 
"The harbor is in fact navigable, not only by private 
boats but by the smaller types of commercial craft, such as 
fishing and oyster boats." People u. Kraemer, 7 Misc. 2d 373, 
380, 164 N.Y.S.2d 423, 429 (Police Ct. Suff. County 1957), 
aff'd, 6 N.Y.2d 363, 160 N.E.2d 633, 189 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1959) 
(quoting with approval from United States u. Appalachian 
Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 416 (1940)). 
"[Tlhe creek and bay had both been actually navigable 
commercially and for pleasure and . . . they still retain their 
capacity for such use . . . . Rivers are navigable in fact when 
they are susceptible of being used in their ordinary condition 
as highways of commerce." People ex rel. New York Cent. 
R.R. u. State Tax Comm'n, 258 A.D. 356, 360-61, 16 N.Y.S.2d 
812, 817 (3d Dept. 1940), aff'd, 284 N.Y. 616, 29 N.E.2d 932 
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(1940) (emphasis added) (Iona Bay, Doodletown Creek, and 
Popolopen Creek are navigable in fact). The court also quoted 
from Economy Light Co. u. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 122- 
23 (1921), stating that "[tlhe capability of use by the public 
for purposes of transportation and commerce affords the true 
criterion of the navigability of a river, rather than the extent 
and manner of that use." 
"[The fact that the river is] used extensively for floating 
logs and transporting logs and timber, products of the forests 
along its banks . . . is quite sufficient to establish its navigabil- 
ity." Finch, Pruyn & Co. u. State, 122 Misc. 404, 408, 203 
N.Y.S. 165, 169 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1924) (Hudson a t  and above 
Glens Falls). 
"[Clapable in [their] natural state and in [their] ordinary 
volume of water of transporting in a condition fit to market 
the products of the forests and mines." Ten Eyck u. Town of 
Warwick, 75 Hun. 562, 566 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2d Dept. 1894) (in- 
let to Greenwood Lake not navigable). 
''[Ulsed for rafting for twenty-six years and upwards . . . . 
When a river is so far navigable as to be of public use in the 
transportation of property, the public claim to  such naviga- 
tion ought to be liberally supported." Shaw u. Crawford, 10 
Johns. 236, 237 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813). 
2.3.3. Definitions Based on Recreational Use - 
Usefulness in commerce has not been the only criterion used 
to determine whether a stream is navigable in fact. A number 
of more recent cases cite actual use of the waterway for recre- 
ational purposes as a basis for finding it to be navigable in 
fact. Only one New York case has been found which suggests 
(apparently as dictum), that a finding of navigability in fact 
could not be based upon recreational use (Lewis u. Clark, 133 
N.Y.S.2d 880 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) discussed infra 5 2.3.3). 
In Trustees of Freeholders and Commonality of South- 
ampton u. Heilner, 84 Misc. 2d 318, 328, 375 N.Y.S.2d 761, 
770 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975), the court cited use by pleasure craft 
as the primary evidence of navigability in fact, stating: "[iln 
today's life it cannot be said that this use is less important to 
society than commercial uses such as logging or transporting 
produce across the water." 
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"[Ilt was traveled by pleasure boats and sport fishing 
boats . . . [this is a] navigable stream." St. Lawrence Shores, 
Inc. u. State , 60 Misc. 2d 74, 78, 302 N.Y.S.2d 606, 612 (N.Y. 
Ct. C1. 1969). 
"[Tlhe fact that a stream has been used for pleasure 
boating may be considered on the subject of the stream's ca- 
pacity and the use of which it is susceptible." Fairchild u. 
Kraemer, 11 A.D.2d 232, 235, 204 N.Y.S.2d 823,826 (2d Dept. 
1960). 
"The creek and bay had both been actually navigable 
commercially and for pleasure and . . . they still retain their 
capacity for such use." People ex rel. New York Cent. R.R. u. 
State Tax Comm'n, 258 A.D. 356, 360, 16 N.Y.S.2d 812, 817 
(3d Dept. 1940), aff'd, 284 N.Y. 616, 29 N.E.2d 932 (1940) 
(emphasis .added) (Iona Bay, Doodletown Creek, and Po- 
polopen Creek are navigable in fact). 
"Nor is lack of commercial traffic a bar to the conclusion 
of navigability where personal or private use by boats demon- 
strates the availability of the stream for the simpler types of 
commercial navigation." People u. Kraemer, 7 Misc. 2d 373, 
380, 164 N.Y.S.2d 423, 429 (Police Ct. Suff. County 1957) 
(quoting with approval from United States u. Appalachian 
Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 416 (1940)). 
"Fleets of boats and canoes came down from which occu- 
pants would camp out overnight, or become guests of hotels 
along the river." The river was held to be navigable. People ex 
rel. New York, 0. & W. Ry. u. State Tax Comm'n, 116 Misc. 
774, 777, 191 N.Y.S. 464, 467 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921) (Susque- 
hanna River). 
See Sawczyk u. United States Coast Guard, 499 F. Supp. 
1034, 1039 (W.D.N.Y. 1980), which found navigability in fact 
based upon a regularly operated raft venture (apparently rec- 
reational) on the grounds that it "evidences the continuing ef- 
fort to exploit the river commercially." 
- 
Contra: 
Lewis u. Clark, 133 N.Y.S.2d 880, 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1954) "Mere depth of water, without profitable utility, will 
not render a watercourse navigable in the legal sense, so as to 
subject it to public servitude, nor will the fact that it is suffi- 
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cient for pleasure boating or to enable hunters and fishermen 
to float their skiffs or canoes. To be navigable, a water course 
must have a useful capacity as a public highway of transporta- 
tion." (quoting Harrison u. Fite, 148 F. 781, 783-84 (8th Cir. 
1906)). 
2.3.4. Effect of Rapids or Other Obstacles to Nav- 
igation - Many cases recognize that places which cannot be 
navigated are frequently found in otherwise navigable streams 
or stretches of streams. However, it is invariably held that: 
"The general character of a stream as to being navigable is 
not changed by the fact that at  a particular place it is not 
navigable in fact by boats." People u. New York & Ontario 
Power Co., 219 A.D. 114, 115, 219 N.Y.S. 497, 500 (3d Dept. 
1927) (Niagara River a t  the falls). 
In Sawczyk u. United States Coast Guard, 499 F. Supp. 
1034, 1039 (W.D.N.Y. 1980), the Falls-to-Lewiston reach of 
the Niagara River was found navigable in fact (and thus sub- 
ject to United States admiralty jurisdiction) despite the fact 
that portions of the river may be non-navigable. The fact 
"that a river is difficult to navigate . . . or even that it is 'inter- 
rupted by occasional natural obstructions' does not preclude a 
finding of navigability in a legal sense." Id. at  1039-40. 
"[Tlhe waters being navigable in part, must be deemed 
navigable in whole." Hawkins u. State, 54 Misc. 2d 847, 852, 
283 N.Y.S.2d 615, 621 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1967) (referring to the 
navigability in fact of East Bay, a portion of Lake Ontario, 
and holding it to be owned by the state, absent an express 
grant). 
"The interruption of navigability by the water falls in the 
middle part of the river did not have any effect upon the legal 
character of the stream." People u. System Properties, 281 
A.D. 433, 444, 120 N.Y.S.2d 269, 279 (3d Dept. 1953), modi- 
fied on other grounds, 2 N.Y.2d 330, 141 N.E.2d 429, 160 
N.Y.S.2d 859, (1957) (Ticonderoga River is navigable). 
"Navigability is not destroyed because of occasional natu- 
ral obstructions or portages, nor it is necessary that navigation 
continue at all seasons of the year . . . ." People ex rel. Erie 
R.R. u. State Tax Comm'n, 266 A.D. 452, 454, 43 N.Y.S.2d 
189, 191 (3d Dept. 1943), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 900, 60 N.E.2d 31 
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The general character of a stream as to being navigable is 
not changed by the fact that at a particular place it is not 
in fact navigable by boats . . . . A public right on a stream 
is a right of travel as on a public highway. It is not neces- 
sary that in order to be navigable the stream should ad- 
mit the passage of boats at all times and at all portions of 
the stream. 
People ex rel. New York Cent. R.R. Co. u. State  Tax ~omm'n ,  
258 A.D. 356, 361, 16 N.Y.S.2d 812,817 (3d Dept. 1940), aff'd, 
284 N.Y. 616, 29 N.E.2d 932 (1940) (Iona Bay, Doodletown 
Creek and Popolopen Creek are navigable in fact). 
"[Tlhe Niagara River, being navigable in part, is thus 
navigable in whole, so far as the control of the river for pur- 
poses of commerce and navigation is concerned." Niagara 
Falls Power Co. u. Water Power and Control Comm'n, 267 
N.Y. 265, 270, 196 N.E. 51, 53 (1935). 
"Rifts and shallows do not affect its general character as 
a navigable stream . . . ." New York Power & Light Corp. v. 
New York, 230 A.D. 338, 342, 245 N.Y.S. 44, 49 (3d Dept. 
1930). 
The Seneca River is navigable in fact "notwithstanding 
interruption of its navigability a t  places by rapids or obstruc- 
tions." James Frazee Milling Co. u. State, 122 Misc. 545, 547, 
204 N.Y.S. 645, 648 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1924). 
"The criterion is the adaptability of the river in its en- 
tirety for the purposes of transportation in and about the lo- 
cality of the place in question." West Virginia Pulp & Paper 
Co. of Delaware u. Peck, 189 A.D. 286, 292, 178 N.Y.S. 663, 
667 (3d Dept. 1919). 
"In order to be navigable, it is not necessary that i t  [a 
stream] should be deep enough to admit passage of boats at  
all portions of the stream." Danes u. New York, 219 N.Y. 67, 
71, 113 N.E. 786, 787 (1916). 
Cf. State u. Bishop, 46 A.D.2d 654,359 N.Y.S.2d 817,820 
(2d Dept. 1974): "[Wlaters, though not navigable in fact are 
deemed navigable in law when they are shallow reaches of 
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navigable waters. Over such waters the power of the State 
extends." 
See also: 
Niagara Falls Power Co. v. Duryea, 185 Misc. 696, 704, 
57 N.Y.S.2d 777, 784 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945) (the Niagara River 
is "a navigable stream even at the point of the falls."). 
People ex rel. New York 0. & W. Ry. u. State Tax 
Comm'n, 116 Misc. 774, 775, 191 N.Y.S. 464, 466 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1921) (Susquehanna River "It is not necessary that, in or- 
der to be navigable, the river should be deep enough to admit 
the passage of boats at  all portions of the stream."). 
Finch Pruyn & Co. u. State, 122 Misc. 404, 408, 203 
N.Y.S. 165, 169 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1924) (Hudson a t  and above 
Glens Falls). 
Powell v. City of Rochester, 93 Misc. 227, 232-33, 157 
N.Y.S. 109, 113 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1916) (Genesee River: "[Tlhe 
fact that certain parts of it were never navigable does not al- 
ter its character as a navigable stream and a public 
highway."). 
I n  re Comm'rs of State Reservation a t  Niagara, 37 Hun. 
537, 547-48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 5th Dept. 1885) ("[Tlhe fact that 
a t  the particular place in the river is not navigable by reason 
of the interruption produced by the falls does not qualify or 
distinguish it in that locality as a public river from it general 
character."). 
2.3.5. Effect of Variations in a Stream's Capacity 
for Navigation - Natural water levels fluctuate and a wa- 
terway's capacity for navigation fluctuates with them. In Mor- 
gan u. King, 35 N.Y. 454, 458-59 (1866), one of the few cases 
to consider this point, the Court of Appeals seemed to stress 
seasonal regularity of navigable capacity rather than con- 
stancy of capacity: 
If [a stream] is ordinarily subject to periodical fluctua- 
tions in the volume and height of its water, attributable 
to natural causes, and recurring as regularly as the sea- 
sons, and if its periods of high water or navigable capac- 
ity, ordinarily, continue a sufficient length of time to 
make it useful as a highway, it is subject to the public 
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easement. 
Id. at  459. 
Two earlier cases, both cited in Morgan u. King, indicate 
that a stream cannot be considered navigable if it practically 
has to be raining for any navigation capability to exist. Curtis 
u. Keesler, 14 Barb. 511, 518 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1852) (Callicoon 
Creek is non-navigable, usable only "an aggregate of some 
four weeks in the year, when swollen . . . ."); and Munson u. 
Hungerford, 6 Barb. 265, 270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849) (Black 
River nbn-navigable between Carthage a i d  Dexter): "It is not 
enough that a stream is capable, (during a period in aggregate 
of from two to four weeks in the year when it is swollen by the 
spring and autumn freshets), of carrying down its rapid course 
whatever may have been thrown upon its angry waters . . . . 9 9 
It is unlikely, however, that these durational require- 
ments for navigability in fact would affect very many streams 
that are worthwhile for either commercial or recreational 
boating. Although whitewater enthusiasts may find certain 
streams interesting only during the times of spring rains and 
snow-melt, a stream's capacity for navigation does not depend 
on its being interesting as whitewater, but rather on its being 
reasonably passable. 
See also: 
People ex rel. Erie R.R. u. State Tax Comm'n, 266 A.D. 
452, 454, 43 N.Y.S.2d 189, 191 (3d Dept. .1943), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 
900, 60 N.E.2d 31 (1944) ("[Nlor is it necessary that the navi- 
gation continue at  all seasons of the year . . . ."). 
James Frazee Milling Co. u. State, 122 Misc. 545, 547, 
204 N.Y.S. 645, 648 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1924) (Seneca River naviga- 
ble in fact) ("[Nlor need the navigation be open a t  all seasons 
of the year or a t  all stages of water."). 
Ten Eyck u. Town of Warwick, 75 Hun. 562, 566 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1894) (inlet to Greenwood Lake not navigable) 
("Neither is it essential that the floatable capacity must be 
continuous. If it be ordinarily and subject to fluctuations in 
volume attributable to natural causes, and occurring with reg- 
ularity and continuing sufficiently long to make it useful as a 
highway, it is subject to public use."). 
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2.3.6. Other Definitional Statements of Naviga- 
bility in Fact - confirm the view that, if a stream is natu- 
rally usable for travel in boats, it is navigable in fact and, 
therefore, legally available for such use. 
"[Tlhe paramount factor . . . is not the actual use to 
which a stream has been put, or the purpose of its use that is 
important, but rather its capacity for use and its susceptibility 
for use (in its original state or condition) for trade, commerce, 
or travel." Fairchild u. Kraemer, 11 A.D.2d 232, 235, 204 
N.Y.S.2d 823, 826 (2d Dept. 1960) (emphasis added) (action 
by the bed-owner for trespass). 
"[Tlhe river has been used by row boats, and canoes . . . 
for traffic, fishing and trapping." People ex rel. Erie R.R. u. 
State Tax Comm'n, 266 A.D. 452, 454, 43 N.Y.S.2d 189, 191 
(3d Dept. 1943), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 900, 60 N.E.2d 31 (1944). 
A stream "does not lose this characteristic [of navigabil- 
ity] even if it has fallen into disuse for a hundred years. 'A 
hundred years is a brief space in the life of a nation'. . . ." Id. 
at  454, 43 N.Y.S.2d at  191-92. 
"[A] sufficient amount of water . . . to allow the naviga- 
tion of small boats and that . . . salt hay, hoop poles and hun- 
dreds of cords of wood were carried out of the creek by means 
of boats and rafts, and that small boats have navigated the 
creek . . . ." People ex rel. New York Cent. R.R. u. State Tax 
Comm'n, 258 A.D. 356, 360, 16 N.Y.S.2d 812, 816 (3d Dept. 
1940), aff'd, 284 N.Y. 616 (1940) (Iona Bay, Doodletown 
Creek, and Popolopen Creek are navigable in fact). 
"Fishermen still continue to navigate the stream in small 
boats . . . . Streams so shallow as to accommodate small size 
craft only are now determined to be navigable in fact." People 
ex rel. New York Cent. R.R. u. State Tax Comm'n, 238 A.D. 
267, 268, 264 N.Y.S. 285, 286 (3d Dept. 1933) (emphasis 
added) (Roeliff Jansen's Kill - also tidal). 
"Motor boats, rowboats, rafts and skiffs navigate the two 
streams [Cascadilla Creek and Six Mile Creek]." People ex 
rel. Lehigh Valley R.R. u. State Tax Comm'n, 247 N.Y. 9, 11, 
159 N.E. 703, 705 (1928). 
"Nor does the fact that the river was not used for trans- 
portation of logs and timber until after the issue of the grant 
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affect the question of navigability at  the time of such issue. 
The river at  that time was susceptible of the use to which it 
was afterward subjected . . . ." Finch, Pruyn & Co. u. State, 
122 Misc. 404, 408, 203 N.Y.S. 165, 169 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1924) 
(emphasis added) (Hudson a t  and above Glens Falls). 
"The capacity to float logs, singly or together, to run rafts 
however small, gives to all the public this easement . . . . 9 9  
People ex rel. New York 0. & W. Ry. u. State Tax Comm'n, 
116 Misc. 774, 776, 191 N.Y.S. 464, 467 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921) 
(Susquehanna River). 
"It is urged [that] . . . the Seneca River being a navigable 
stream, it did not lose its navigable character because of any 
obstructions which were permitted to exist therein or over the 
same . . . . We think the position thus taken . . . is correct." 
Lehigh Valley R.R. u. Canal Board, 146 A.D. 151, 158-59, 130 
N.Y.S. 978, 982-83 (4th Dept. 1911), aff'd, 204 N.Y. 471 
(1912). 
"Whether salt, or fresh, water streams, if they were large 
enough to be capable of common passage and thus, in fact, 
were navigable, they were regarded as common highways, 
which might not be impeded." Fulton Light, Heat & Power 
Co. u. New York, 200 N.Y. 400, 412, 94 N.E. 199, 202 (1911). 
Because some products may be floated to market as rafts 
and upon rafts, it is not essential to the public character 
of the stream that property can be carried in vessels . . . . 
As some streams are unnavigable against their current, if 
they are floatable in their natural state, so as to be of 
public use with the current, their public character is liber- 
ally supported. 
Ten Eyck u. Town of Warwick, 75 Hun. 562, 566 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1894) (inlet to Greenwood Lake not navigable). 
"[Nlavigable by small vessels." Crooked Lake Nav. Co. u. 
Keuka Nau. Co., 4 N.Y. St. Rep. 380, 383 (Sup. Ct. 5th Dept. 
1887) aff'd, 115 N.Y. 667, 22 N.E. 1126 (1889) (Keuka Lake 
navigable). 
"[Rlivers of sufficient magnitude and capacity for naviga- 
tion are public highways, and . . . [the rights of private owners 
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are] . . . subject to the easement of the public, which they 
cannot lawfully interrupt." I n  re Comm'rs of St. Reservation 
a t  Niagara, 37 Hun. 537, 545 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 5th Dept. 1885). 
"It is not necessary that the stream should be navigable 
through its whole length. The public may use such portions of 
it as are navigable . . . ." Curtis u. Keesler, 14 Barb. 511, 518 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1852) (holding Callicoon Creek unnavigable, 
relying on the "uncontrovertible principles of the common 
law" on stream ownership as pronounced by Lord Hale). 
"[Nlavigable for vessels, boats, lighters, and as it has also 
been held, for rafts." Munson v. Hungerford, 6 Barb. 265, 269 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849) (holding the Black River non-navigable 
between Carthage and Dexter). 
"[Wlhether they are susceptible or not of use as common 
passage for the public." People v. Platt, 17 Johns. 195, 211 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819). 
2.4. Statutory/Regulatory Definitions of "Naviga- 
tion" or "Navigable" - For various purposes, the Legisla- 
ture or administrative agencies acting under statutory man- 
date have classified waters in terms of "navigability" in order 
to define the applicability of particular legislative programs. 
In general, the concepts of navigability for such purposes are 
fairly close to the common-law concept of navigable in fact. It 
is important to note, however, that the various statutorylregu- 
latory definitions of navigability are not necessarily identical 
to the common law concept. The cases elaborating on the for- 
mer may, therefore, not necessarily have any relevance to the 
public right of passage. 
2.4.1. The New York Navigation Law - defines 
"navigable waters of the state" to mean: "all lakes, rivers, 
streams and waters within the boundaries of the state and not 
privately owned, which are navigable in fact or upon which . 
vessels are operated, except the tidewaters of Nassau and Suf- 
folk Counties." N.Y. Nav. Law Q 2[4] (McKinney 1941 & 
Supp. 1989) (emphasis added). The same statute defines 
"navigable in fact" as: 
navigable in its natural or unimproved condition, afford- 
ing a channel for useful commerce of a substantial and 
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permanent character conducted in the customary mode of 
trade and travel on water. A theoretical or potential navi- 
gability, or one that is temporary, precarious or unprofita- 
ble is not sufficient, but to be navigable in fact a lake or 
stream must have practical usefulness to the public as a 
highway for transportation. 
N.Y. Nav. Law § 2[5] (McKinney 1941 & Supp. 1989). 
The Navigation Law does not have any provisions of di- 
rect bearing on the public's right of passage. These definitions 
establishing the scope of the Navigation Law do not purport 
to  affect the common-law definitions of navigability for pur- 
poses of the public's right of passage. 
2.4.2. The Department of Environmental Conser- 
vation Regulations - define "navigable waters of the 
state" to  mean: 
all lakes, rivers, streams and other bodies of water in the 
State which are navigable in fact or upon which vessels 
with a capacity of one or more persons can be operated. It 
shall not include waters which are surrounded by land 
held in single private ownership at every point in their 
total area. 
6 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, $ 608.l(h) (1984). 
2.4.3. Federal Definitions - Because they define the 
reach of federal authority t o  regulate the  nation's navigable 
waterways, these definitions of navigability tend t o  be broadly 
framed, e.g.: 
[Tlhe Genesee River is 'navigable waters' from Rochester 
to Mount Morris, if (I) it  presently is being used or is 
suitable for use, or (2) it has been used or was suitable for 
use in the past, or (3) it could be made suitable for use in 
the future by reasonable improvements. 
Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. u. Federal Power Comm'n, 344 
F.2d.594, 596 (2d Cir. 1965) (Genesee navigable a t  Rochester, 
but not shown to be navigable a t  Mount Morris, for purposes 
of Federal Power Act and Rivers and Harbors Act). 
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The most important distinction between New York's 
common law definition and the federal definition is that, a t  
least since 1940, the latter also considers artificial improve- 
ments that enhance, presently or prospectively, a stream's 
usefulness for transportation. See the federal landmark case, 
United States u. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 
407-10 (1940). It remains to be seen whether the New York 
courts will similarly expand upon their own traditional com- 
mon law definition (which traditionally considers only the 
natural condition of the stream). For a positive sign, see Peo- 
ple v. System Properties, 281 A.D. 433,443, 120 N.Y.S.2d 269, 
278-279 (3d Dept. 1953) (Ticonderoga River is navigable), 
modified on other grounds, 2 N.Y.2d 330, 141 N.E.2d 429, 160 
N.Y.S.2d 859 (1957). 
While the federal definition of "natural" navigability is 
itself very broad, the Court of Appeals has observed that "the 
New York definition may be even broader." Van Cortlandt v. 
New York Cent. R.R., 265 N.Y. 249, 255, 192 N.E. 401, 402 
(1934) (Croton River). 
2.4.4. Other Statutory Definitions - occasionally 
appear in the cases. Again, it should be remembered that 
these statutory interpretations do not necessarily have any 
bearing whatsoever on the common law concept of "navigabil- 
ity in fact" for purposes of the public right of passage. For 
example: 
Brunt Lake Shores, Inc. v. Barton, 61 Misc. 2d 902, 907, 
307 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970) (construing a 
legislative declaration that a certain stream and lake were 
"public highways for the purpose of floating logs, timber and 
lumber down those streams"; the court held that the legisla- 
ture did not thereby mandate use for swimming or boating). 
Van Cortlandt u. New York Cent. R.R., 265 N.Y. 249, 
254, 254 N.E. 401, 402 (1934) (railroad charter requiring mov- 
able bridges over "navigable" streams; the court held it inap- 
plicable to Croton River). 
2.5. Specific Streams and Waterbodies - under the 
common law definitions: 
2.5.1. Held or Said to be Navigable in Fact: 
Ausable River - Brewster u. J. & J. Rogers Co., 169 N.Y. 
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73, 78, 62 N.E. 164, 165 (1901). 
Battenkill - Shaw u. Crawford, 10 Johns. 236, 237 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1813). 
Canandaigua Lake - Granger u. City of Canandaigua, 
257 N.Y. 126, 132, 177 N.E. 394, 396 (1931). 
Canisteo River - Browne & Jamison u. Scofield, 8 Barb. 
239, 243 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850). 
Cascadilla Creek - People ex rel. Lehigh Valley Ry. u. 
State Tax Comm'n, 247 N.Y. 9, 12, 159 N.E. 703, 705 (1928) 
(motor boats, rowboats, rafts, skiffs). 
Cayuga Lake - Stewart v. Turney, 237 N.Y. 117, 120, 
142 N.E. 437, 438 (1923) (also mentions Canaderaga, Caze- 
novia, Cranberry, Cross, George, Oneida, Onondaga, Otisco, 
Otsego, Owasco, Saranac, Saratoga, Schroon, Skaneateles and 
Tupper Lakes as navigable in fact); New York State Water 
Resources Comm'n u. Liberman, 37 A.D.2d 484, 488, 326 
N.Y.S.2d 284, 288 (3d Dept. 1971). 
Chemung River - Bacorn u. State, 20 Misc. 2d 369, 372, 
195 N.Y.S.2d 214, 217 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1959); People ex rel. Erie 
R.R. u. State  Tax Comm'n, 266 A.D. 452, 455, 43 N.Y.S.2d 
189, 192 (3d Dept. 1943), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 900, 60 N.E.2d 31 
(1944). 
Chenango River - Chenango Bridge Co. u. Paige, 83 
N.Y. 178, 185 (1886). 
Crooked Creek - St. Lawrence Shores u. State, 60 Misc. 
2d 74, 79, 302 N.Y.S.2d 606, 612 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1969). 
Doodletown Bight - People ex rel. New York Cent. R.R. 
u. State Tax Comm'n, 258 A.D. 356, 361, 16 N.Y.S.2d 812, 818 
(3d Dept. 1940), aff'd, 284 N.Y. 616, 29 N.E.2d 932 (1940). 
Genesee River - People ex rel. Western New York & P. 
Ry. u. State  Tax Comm'n, 244 N.Y. 596, 597, 155 N.E. 911, 
912 (1927). 
Hemlock Lake - Smith u. Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 474 
(1883). 
Hudson River - Finch, Pruyn & Co. u. State, 122 Misc. 
404,408, 203 N.Y.S. 165,169 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1924) (at and above 
Glens Falls). 
Iona Creek Bay - People ex rel. New York Cent. R.R. v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 258 A.D. 356, 361, 16 N.Y.S.2d 812, 818 
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(3d Dept. 1940), aff'd, 284 N.Y. 616, 29 N.E.2d 932 (1940). 
Island Creek - People u. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 
N.Y. 194, 198, 107 N.E. 506 (1914). 
Keuka Lake - Crooked Lake Nau. Co. u. Keuka Nau. 
Co., 4 N.Y. St. Rep. 380, 383 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 5th Dept. 1887) 
aff'd, 115 N.Y. 667, 22 N.E. 1126 (1889). 
Mohawk River - Danes v. New York, 219 N.Y. 67, 70, 
113 N.E. 786, 787 (1916). 
Niagara River - Sawczyk u. United States Coast Guard, 
499 F. Supp. 1034, 1039 (W.D.N.Y. 1980) (Falls to  Lewiston; 
even though "forbidding and dangerous"); See also Niagara 
Falls Power Co. u. Water Power and  Control Comm'n, 267 
N.Y. 265, 270, 196 N.E. 51, 53 (1935); Commissioners of the 
State Reseru. a t  Niagara, 37 Hun. 537, 547 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 5th 
Dept. 1885). 
, Peekskill Bay - People ex rel. New York Cent. R.R. v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 239 N.Y. 183 (1924). 
Popolopen Creek - People ex rel. New York Cent. R.R. 
v. State Tax Comm'n, 258 A.D. 356, 361, 16 N.Y.S.2d 812,818 
(3d Dept. 1940), aff'd, 284 N.Y. 616, 29 N.E.2d 932 (1940). 
Oswego River - Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. u. New 
York, 200 N.Y. 400, 412, 94 N.E.2d 199, 202 (1911) (certain 
stretches other than a t  Fulton). 
Roeliff Jansen's Kill - People ex rel. New York Cent. 
R.R. u. State Tax Comm'n, 238 A.D. 267, 268, 264 N.Y.S. 285, 
286 (3d Dept. 1933) (also tidal). 
Salmon River (near Lake Ontario) - Hooker v. Cum- 
mings, 20 Johns. 90, 100-01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822). 
Seneca River - James Frazee Milling Co. u. State, 122 
Misc. 545,547, 204 N.Y.S. 645,648 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1924); Lehigh 
Valley R.R. v. Canal Board, 69 Misc. 251, 255, 125 N.Y.S. 227, 
230, aff'd, 146 A.D. 151, 158, 130 N.Y.S. 978, 982 (4th Dept. 
1911), aff'd, 204 N.Y. 471, 97 N.E. 964 (1912). 
Six Mile Creek - People ex rel. Lehigh Valley Ry. v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 247 N.Y. 9, 159 N.E. 703, 705 (1928). 
Susquehanna River - People ex rel. New York, 0. & W. 
Ry. u. State  Tax Comm'n, 116 Misc. 774, 775, 191 N.Y.S. 464, 
466 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921) (from Otsego Lake throughout its 
course). 
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Ticonderoga River - People u. System Properties, 281 
A.D. 433, 443, 120 N.Y.S.2d 269, 279 (3d Dept. 1953), modi- 
fied on other grounds, 2 N.Y.2d 330, 141 N.E.2d 429, 160 
N.Y.S.2d 859 (1957). 
2.5.2. Held or Said to be Non-navigable in Fact: 
Black River - Munson u. Hungerford, 6 Barb. 265, 270 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849) (Carthage to Dexter). 
Callicoon Creek - Curtis v. Keesler, 14 Barb. 511, 518 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Spec T. 1852). 
Crumhorn Lake - Mix u. Tice, 164 Misc. 261, 266, 298 
N.Y.S. 441, 447 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937). 
,Greenwood Lake - Ten Eyck v. Town of Warwick, 75 
Hun. 562, 567 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2d Dept. 1894) (not a highway 
from one town to another). 
Honeoye Creek - Smith u. Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 475 
(1883). 
Oswego River - Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. New 
York, 200 N.Y. 400, 412, 94 N.E.2d 199, 202 (1911) (at 
Fulton). 
Peekskill Creek - People ex rel. New York Cent. R.R. u. 
State Tax Comm'n, 239 N.Y. 183, 186, 146 N.E. 197, 198 
(1924). 
Racquette River - Morgan v. King, 35 N.Y. 454, 458 
(1866) (Colton to Raymondsville). 
Saranac River - People u. Platt, 17 Johns. 195, 216 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819). 
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Chapter 111. 
OWNERSHIP OF STREAMBEDS 
3. Ownership of Streambeds - The ownership ques- 
tion has been the primary litigated issue in the New York 
cases that deal with the public's rights in navigable waters. I t  
is clear, by the way, that state law rather than federal law 
controls this issue: 
The long-settled rule is that the states, and not the fed- 
eral government, hold title to the subaqueous land within 
their boundaries and have the concomitant power to de- 
termine the nature and extent of the interests adjacent 
land owners and others may acquire, subject only to the 
dominant federal right of navigation. 
United States v. Kane, 602 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1979). See 
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 
U.S. 53, 60 (1913) (state law controls on issue of ownership). 
In New York, title to streambed lands depends funda- 
mentally, like all land titles, on the history and proper inter- 
pretation of the chain of conveyances beginning with the root 
of title. The roots of land titles in New York are usually the 
original grants from either the state or from the colonial rep-' 
resentatives of the British monarch. The critical question with 
respect to underwater lands is generally whether the original 
grantor intended to include such lands in the grant when the 
. adjacent uplands were conveyed into private ownership. This 
question is, in principle, one of interpreting the conveyance 
but, as a practical matter, the grantor's intention is usually 
established by a legal presumption. 
Under the traditional English common-law rule, now fol- 
lowed in New York, the legal presumption favors the riparian 
owners: absent an express intent to the contrary, grants of 
land on non-tidal streams are presumed intended to run to 
the center of the stream, irrespective of the stream's capacity 
for navigation in fact. This is in contrast to the dominant 
American rule, under which all lands beneath actually naviga- 
ble non-tidal waters are presumed to be still retained as prop- 
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erty of the state. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 256-57 (Clark 
ed. 1967). 
The earliest New York cases wavered between these two 
rules of interpretation. Despite Chancellor Kent's strong but 
possibly misconceived seminal endorsement of the English 
rule in 1805 (See supra $ 2.2), the dominant American rule 
almost became the law of New York. Indeed, in 1865 the 
Court of Appeals declared "as the settled law of the State" 
that the beds of "generally navigable" freshwater streams be- 
long to the state. People ex rel. Loomis v. Canal Appraisers, 
33 N.Y. 461, 479-81, 500 (1865). See infra section 3.2.1.2. 
However, the effect of this ruling was later limited to the 
Hudson and Mohawk Rivers. Smith v. Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 
481-82 (1883). With the exception of those two rivers, the 
boundary rivers and large lakes, the beds of New York's fresh 
waters are now generally deemed to be in private ownership, 
having been conveyed to private owners as part of the grants 
of the riparian lands. See Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. u. 
New York, 200 N.Y. 400, 416, 94 N.E. 199, 203 (1911) ("[A] 
rule, which, by [its] long standing, has acquired the stability 
of a rule of property"; bed of Oswego is private); Waterford 
Elec. Light, Heat & Power Co. v. New York, 208 A.D. 273, 
281, 203 N.Y.S. 858, 866-67 (3d Dept. 1924), aff'd, 239 N.Y. 
629, 147 N.E. 225 (1925) (English rule is "now firmly estab- 
lished" except as to Hudson and Mohawk). 
Even while most lands under New York's rivers and lakes 
are in private ownership, i t  must be emphasized that the fa- 
miliar concept of ownership applies in only a very qualified 
way to land beneath waters that are navigable in fact. As - 
Chancellor Kent himself wrote in support of his historic dic- 
tum, private title to the beds of fresh, non-tidal rivers can be 
"granted without any public inconvenience, because the right 
of the public, to the use of the water for navigation would re- 
main incontestible." Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 307, 319-20 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (Hudson a t  Stillwater). Moreover, as the 
Court of Appeals later noted in finally embracing the English 
rule: 
When it is considered that the rights and interests of the 
Heinonline - -  6 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 4 8 8  1 9 8 8 - 1 9 8 9  
19891 PUBLIC RIGHTS 
public, such as fishing, ferrying and transportation, are 
preserved in all navigable waters by the inherent and ina- 
lienable attributes of the sovereign, it would seem to fol- 
low that the controversies which have arisen over nominal 
ownership of the soil under such waters have magnified 
beyond the real interests involved. 
Smith u. City of Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 480 (1883) (emphasis 
added). Much of the confusion about the public's right of pas- 
sage over streams has arisen, no doubt, because these major 
qualifications on private streambed ownership are often 
overlooked. 
3.1. The English Law on Streambed Titles - is 
relevant in two respects: 
(1) the common law in New York has been heavily influ- 
enced by the English doctrines on publiclprivate rights in 
streams. Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. u. New York, 
200 N.Y. 400, 412-13, 94 N.E. 199, 202 (1911). New York 
is, indeed, one of the few states which has adopted the 
English rules rather than the now-dominant American 
rules for determining streambed titles. 
(2) many titles to specific riparian lands originated as 
conveyances from the British monarch in colonial times; 
the interpretation of these conveyances - though, in 
principle, a matter of New York colonial law - is primar- 
ily (but not entirely) controlled by the doctrines applica- 
ble in England a t  the time the conveyances were made. 
See Danes u. New York, 219 N.Y. 67, 72-75, 113 N.E. 786, 
787-88 (1916). 
As a general matter, the English law regarded freshwater 
rivers to be in private ownership: 
Fresh rivers of what kind soever, do of common right be- 
long to the owners of the soil adjacent so that the owners 
of the one side have of common right the propriety of the 
soil, and consequently the right of fishing, usque filum 
aquae;2 and the owners of the other side the right of soil 
or ownership and fishing unto the filum aqua on their 
2. 1.e.. to the "thread" or middle of the stream. 
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side. And if a man be owner of the land of both sides, in 
common presumption he is owner of the whole river, and 
hath the right of fishing according to the extent of his 
land in length. With this agrees the common experience. 
Hargrave's Hale, De Ju re  Maris, ch. I (quoted at length in 
People ex rel. Loomis u. Canal Appraisers, 33 N.Y. 461, 469 
(1865)). 
3.1.1. The "Jus Privatum" and the "Jus Publicum" 
- Following the lead of the English common law, the New 
York cases recognize that  the sovereign ownership of under- 
water land is divided into two distinct components, the so- 
called "jus priuatum" or private right and the "jus publicum" 
or public right. The court in People u. Steeplechase Park Co., 
218 N.Y. 459, 472-73, 113 N.E. 521, 524 (1916), explained as 
follows: 
A distinction was taken between mere ownership of the 
soil under water and the control over it for public pur- 
poses. The ownership of the soil, analogous to the owner- 
ship of dry land, was regarded as jus priuatum, and was 
vested in the crown. But the right to use and control both 
the land and the water was deemed a jus publicum, and 
was vested in Parliament. [Quoting Langdon v. Mayor, 93 
N.Y. 129, 154-55 (1883).] In this country, the state has 
succeeded to all rights of both crown and Parliament in 
the navigable waters and the soil under them, and here 
the jus privatum and the jus publicum are both vested in 
the state. 
People u. Steeplechase Park, 218 N.Y. 459, 473, 113 N.E. 521, 
524 (1916). The  term jus publicum is sometimes used loosely 
t o  refer to  "the rights of the general public . . . to use naviga- 
ble waters . . . for fishing, boating and other lawful purposes." 
Durham u. Ingrassia, 105 Misc. 2d 191, 431 N.Y.S.2d 917, 922 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). See also Tucci u. Salzhauer, 40 A.D.2d 
712, 336 N.Y.S.2d 721, 723 (2d Dept. 1972), aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 
854, 307 N.E.2d 256, 352 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1973); and People of 
Smithtown u. Poueromo, 71 Misc. 2d 524, 531, 336 N.Y.S.2d 
764,773-74 (Sup. Ct. 1972), reu'd on other grounds, 79 A.D.2d 
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42, 359 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1973) (Nissequogue River) ("rights of 
navigation, travel along the foreshore, fishing and bathing"). 
In Pouermo, the court also said, in a somewhat different vein, 
that "the jus publicum is nothing more than the great police 
power of the state." Pouermo, 71 Misc. 2d 524, 534, 336 
N.Y.S.2d 764, 776. See also Arnold's Inn, Inc. u. Morgan, 63 
Misc. 2d 279, 283, 310 N.Y.S.2d 541,547 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970), 
modified, 35 A.D.2d 989, 317 N.Y.S.2d 989 (2d Dept. 1970). 
In the discussion of this section on ownership of 
streambeds, the "ownership" being discussed is the basic fee 
simple ownership, or jus priuatum. 
3.1.2. The Public Trust Doctrine - At an earlier 
time, the English monarchs apparently found irresistible the 
temptation to pick up extra cash by selling off bits and pieces 
of the navigable tidewaters surrounding the British Isles. In 
order to mitigate the effects of these transactions on the pub- 
lic a t  large, the so-called "Public Trust" Doctrine emerged. 
As a New York court has explained: "The title to lands 
under tide waters, within the realm of England, were, by the 
common law, deemed to be vested in the king as a public 
trust, to subserve and protect the public right to use them as 
common highways for commerce, trade and intercourse." Peo- 
ple u. New York & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 76 
(1877) (emphasis added). In other words, "the king, as parens 
patriae, owned the [submerged] soil . . . not for his own bene- 
fit, but for the benefit of his subjects at  large . . . and he can 
not now deprive his subjects of these rights by granting the 
public navigable waters to individuals." Lansing u. Smith, 4 
Wend. 9, 20-21 (N.Y. 1829) (emphasis added). 
The main point of the English Public Trust Doctrine was 
to prevent the king from destroying the public's right of pas- 
sage and fishing. If he conveyed trust lands into private own- 
ership, the grantee took subject to the jus publicum unless 
the king had Parliament's consent to convey a free and clear 
title. Id. The doctrine was, in short, a check on royal whims. 
In New York, the notion frequently appears in the cases 
that the state holds certain of its lands, especially the under- 
water lands, subject to a public trust. Indeed, the public trust 
has even been expanded to embrace not merely tidal waters, 
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as in England, but also rivers, e.g., Fulton Light, Heat & 
Power Co. v. New York, 200 N.Y. 400, 418, 94 N.E. 199, 204 
(1911), and lakes, e.g., Granger v. City of Canandaigua, 257 
N.Y. 126, 132, 177 N.E. 394, 396 (1931). However, the public 
trust is no check on sovereignty. The law is clear that the Leg- 
islature, as successor to both the king and Parliament, has the 
power to convey underwater lands into private hands free of 
the public trust and free of the public right of passage. See 
infra $ 4.6. There are some qualifications (See infra $ 4.6.4), 
but they exist because of public policy, not because of a public 
trust. 
Some representative judicial discussion of the public trust 
concept in New York follows: 
The corpus of the trust encompasses public lands and 
navigable waters, the people represent the cestui que 
trust, and the sovereign is the trustee. It is the unquali- 
fied duty of the trustee to preserve the trust corpus for 
the benefit of the people tius publicum). The jus pub- 
licum is nothing more than the great police power of the 
people. 
People of Smithtown v. Poveromo, 71 Misc. 2d 524, 534, 336 
N.Y.S.2d 764, 776 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972), rev'd on other 
grounds, 79 Misc. 2d 42, 359 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1973) (Nisse- 
quogue River). 
"[Wlhile conveyance of lands under water for a public 
purpose is permissible because it accords with the public 
trust, purpose is not the determinative factor." Riviera Ass'n, 
Inc. v. North Hempstead, 52 Misc. 2d 575, 582, 276 N.Y.S.2d 
249, 256-57 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967) (containing an extensive re- 
view of the cases). 
In People u. System Properties Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 330, 344- 
45, 141 N.E.2d 429, 435, 160 N.Y.S.2d 859, 868 (1957), speak- 
ing of the sovereign power over Lake George, the Court of Ap- 
peals wrote: "The reach of that power in trust for the People 
is as great as the use and possibilities of the lake for naviga- 
tion, as a water power reservoir and not excluding recrea- 
tional uses." (emphasis added). 
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"[Tlitle to the bed of Canandaigua Lake is in the State of 
New York in trust for all the people thereof." Granger u. City 
of Canandaigua, 257 N.Y. 126, 132, 177 N.E. 394, 396 (1931) 
(a dispute over lake bed title). 
"The proprietary interest of the riparian owner is 
subordinate to the public easement of passage and the state 
may be regarded as the trustee of a special public servitude." 
Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. u. New York, 200 N.Y. 400, 
418, 94 N.E. 199, 204 (1911) (emphasis added). 
The right to grant the navigable waters is as absolute and 
uncontrollable . . . as its right to grant the dry land which 
it owns. It holds all the public domain as absolute owner, 
and is in no sense a trustee thereof, except as it is organ- 
ized and possesses all its property, functions and powers 
for the benefit of the people. 
Langdon u. Mayor, 93 N.Y. 129, 156 (1883) (emphasis added). 
While the state holds title to lands under navigable water 
in a certain sense as a trustee for the public, it is compe- 
tent for the supreme legislative power to authorize and 
regulate grants of the same for public, or such other pur- 
poses as it may determine to be for the best interests of 
the state. 
Saunders u. New York C. & H. R.R., 144 N.Y. 75, 86, 38 N.E. 
992, 994 (1894). 
"The State, in place of the crown, holds the title, as trus- 
tee of a public trust, but the legislature may, as representative 
of the people, grant the soil, or confer an exclusive privilege in 
tidewaters or authorize a use inconsistent with the public 
right." People u. New York & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 
N.Y. 71, 78 (1877) (emphasis added). 
"The public rights of navigation are . . . easements or ser- 
vitudes which the State is bound and empowered to preserve 
and protect as a trustee for its citizens." Commissioners of the 
Canal Fund u. Kempshall, 26 Wend. 404, 420 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1841). 
Other significant cases noting the public trust doctrine 
Heinonline - -  6 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 4 9 3  1 9 8 8 - 1 9 8 9  
494 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6 
are: 
Miller u. City of New York, 15 N.Y.2d 34, 203 N.E.2d 
478, 255 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1964) (park property impressed with a 
trust for the public cannot be alienated without express legis- 
lative sanction); Brooklyn Park Comm'n u. Armstrong, 45 
N.Y. 234 (1871); Long Sault Deu. Co. v. Kennedy, 212 N.Y. 1, 
10, 105 N.E. 849, 852 (1914), quoting the United States Su- 
preme Court landmark on the public trust, Illinois Cent. R.R. 
u. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892); Coxe u. State, 144 N.Y. 
396, 406, 39 N.E. 400, 402 (1895). 
3.2. The General Rule of Streambed Ownership 
in New York - is that "the bed of [a non-tidal stream] is 
subject to private ownership, regardless of navigability." Peo- 
ple u. System Properties, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 330, 340, 141 N.E.2d 
429, 432, 160 N.Y.S.2d 859, 864 (1957). The court in System 
Properties made its determination of whether the claimant in- 
deed had private ownership of the bed of the Ticonderoga 
River by examining the two possible roots of such a title, uiz.: 
- - 
(a) title received under a grant of the river bed, or 
(b) title by adverse possession or prescription. 
The court held that the claimant's grant excluded the bed of 
the river, but the claimant had acquired title by adverse pos- 
session to at  least a portion of the bed by maintaining a series 
of dams on the riverbed over a period of 160 years. 
3.2.1. Particular Holdings - Most of the New York 
cases which have considered the ownership of the beds of spe- 
cific freshwater (non-tidal) streams have found the ownership 
to be held by the private riparian owners; a few have not, 
though their principle has, as earlier noted, been limited to 
the Hudson and Mohawk rivers. 
3.2.1.1. Title to Beds of Freshwater Rivers Held 
to be in Private Riparian Owners - In People u. Waite, 
103 Misc. 2d 204, 206,425 N.Y.S.2d 462,463 (St. Law. County 
Ct. 1979), a prosecution for trespass, i t  was said: 
The bed of non-navigable streams, or other bodies of 
water, is subject to private ownership and the title 
thereto, as a general rule, is vested in the proprietors of 
the adjoining uplands. . . [Tlhe law of the State of New 
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York allows title to the bed of navigable waters which are 
tideless . . . to be vested in the riparian owners. (emphasis 
added). 
In Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. u. New York, 200 
N.Y. 401, 415-16, 94 N.E. 199, 203 (1911), the court 
concluded: 
[Tlhe common law rule governs with respect to the char- 
acter of the Oswego river and being, within its [ebb-and- 
flow] definition, non-navigable in law, the state would not 
hold title to its bed by virtue of its sovereignty and could 
exercise no other right therein . . . except as such right 
might relate to the improvement of the channel and bed 
of the river for the purposes of navigation and commerce, 
as one for the advantage of the public easement. [The 
court described the ebb-and-flow test of streambed title 
as one] which, by long standing, has acquired the stability 
of a rule of property. 
Id. 
In Smi th  u. Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 479 (1883), the court 
approvingly quoted an extensive footnote to Ex p a r t e  J e n -  
nings, 6 Cow. 517, 543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826) to the effect that: 
Rivers not navigable, that is fresh waters of what kind so- 
ever, do of common right belong to the owners of the soil 
adjacent to the extent of their land length. . . . That this 
ownership of the citizen is of the whole river, viz. the soil 
and the water of the river, except that in his river where 
boats, rafts, etc. may be floated to market, the public 
have a right of way or easement. 
In Chenango Bridge Co. v. Paige, 83 N.Y. 178, 184 (1880), 
the court wrote: "The Chenango River is a fresh water stream. 
I t  is the private property of the riparian owners. The public, 
in such streams, have an easement only for navigation and for 
floating of logs and timber." 
In Varick u. Smith,  9 Paige Ch. 547, 554-57 (N.Y. Ch. 
1842) (Oswego), the Vice Chancellor wrote that, notwithstand- 
ing some contrary intimations in Canal  Appraisers v. People 
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ex rel. Tibbits, 17 Wend. 571 (N.Y. 1836), the ebb-and-flow 
test of state ownership applies in New York, and the latter 
case, in holding the bed of the Mohawk to be state owned, is 
authority only for the Mohawk itself. See also Varick u. 
Smith, 5 Paige Ch. 137 (N.Y. Ch. 1835) (Oswego). 
In Luce v. Carley, 24 Wend. 450, 452-53 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1840) (Onondaga River), the court expressed concern that, if 
grants of stream-side lands were not construed to include the 
lands under water as well, "water gores would be multiplied 
by the thousands along the inland streams, small and great." 
"[Nlothing is better settled than that grants of lands, 
bounded upon rivers or streams where the tide does not ebb 
or flow, carry the exclusive right of the grantee to the middle 
of the stream unless . . . clearly and unequivocally [intended 
to] not extend beyond the water's edge." Canal Appraisers u. 
People ex rel. Tibbits, 13 Wend. 355, 371 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1835), reu'd, 17 Wend. 571, 612 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836). This 
case was decided during the period when New York was still 
wavering on these issues. See supra $ 3. 
But cf.: Commissioners of the Canal Fund u. Kempshall, 
26 Wend. 404, 416-17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841), where it was ar- 
gued that it was unnecessary to the holding in Tibbits 17 
Wend. 571, 612 (N.Y. 1836), reu'g, 13 Wend. 355, 371 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1835), to reject the suitability of the ebb-and-flow 
rule for New York, and it was declared that the rule in New 
York was "still . . . an open question": The court held that the 
Genesee River is privately owned. 
See also: 
Meadvin v. State, 22 A.D.2d 326, 327, 255 N.Y.S.2d 357, 
359 (4th Dept. 1965) (Onondaga Creek). 
People ex rel. New York, 0. & W. Ry. v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 116 Misc. 774, 778, 191 N.Y.S. 464, 466 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1921) (Susquehanna River). 
3.2.1.2. Title to Beds of Freshwater Rivers Held 
to be in State - A number of early judicial opinions stated 
that the English common law view, regarding ownership of 
non-tidal but navigable fresh rivers as private, was unsuited 
to the conditions existing in New York. The application of the 
English rule in New York was, on that ground, sometimes de- 
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nied. However, the particular facts before the courts in those 
cases that declared the state to be the owner of non-tidal riv- 
erbeds happened to arise in relation to only the Hudson and 
Mohawk Rivers. Despite the broad language which those cases 
used in rejecting the English rule, the Court of Appeals later 
decided not to extend their precedential effect to other fresh 
water streams. 
In People ex rel. Loomis u. Canal Appraisers, 33 N.Y. 
461 (1865), the Court'of Appeals questioned the authenticity 
of what is usually understood to be the English common law 
of freshwater stream ownership (as expounded by Lord Hale's 
famous treatise), stating that "much misapprehension has ex- 
isted as to what doctrine he actually promulgated." Id. a t  469. 
An extensive analysis of the English cases was provided, with 
the conclusion that, in England, "the flow and reflow of the 
tide is [only] prima facie evidence . . . of the fact that the 
river is navigable" for purposes of title, fishery rights, etc. Id. 
at  469-72. The court likewise reviewed the early New York 
lower court cases, observing a t  length that the previous hold- 
ings both embraced and rejected the view that fresh water, 
navigable in fact, belongs to the private riparian owners. I t  
concluded its review of the contradictory authorities by' select- 
ing "as the settled law of the state" that "generally navigable" 
freshwater streams belong to the state. See id. at  500, 479-81. 
(This holding was later limited to the Mohawk River in Smith 
u. Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 481-82 (1883). See introductory 
paragraphs to this chapter, supra.) 
See also: 
Lehigh Valley R.R. u. Canal Board, 69 Misc. 251, 255, 125 
N.Y.S. 227, 231 (1910): "[Tlhe fee of the bed of the [Seneca] 
river, as of all navigable streams, is vested in the state, and 
that [the private] plaintiff has no property rights therein." 
aff'd on other grounds, 146 A.D. 151, 157-58, 130 N.Y.S. 978, 
982 (4th Dept. 1911), aff'd, 204 N.Y. 471 (1912). 
Roberts u. Baumgarten, 110 N.Y. 380, 383, 18 N.E. 96, 97 
(1888), stating in dicta that the English ebb-and-flow rule of 
navigability for ownership was "plainly inapplicable to our 
large inland rivers and lakes," and citing Loomis, supra, with 
approval. 
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In Brown u. Scofield, 8 Barb. 239, 243 (Sup. Gen. T. 
1850), an action for obstructing a public river (the Canisteo) 
with a dam, it was said: 
The common law of England upon this subject, from its 
utter want of fitness and adaptation to the condition of 
things here, in our extended territory, with its numerous 
inland lakes and countless streams . . . has never been 
adopted, or if adopted, i t  has been in a form modified and 
improved to fit the condition of the country, and the 
wants of its inhabitants. 
The judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed, but the court did 
not actually render a decision as to ownership of the bed of 
the river. 
Canal  Appraisers u. People ex rel. Tibbits, 17  Wend. 571, 
612-20 (N.Y. 1836) (rejected the suitability of the ebb-and- 
flow test of "navigability" for New York). See  § 3.4.3. 
Canal CommJn u. People ex rel. Tibbits, 5 Wend. 423, 
460, 464 (N.Y. 1830), in which Beardsley, S. wrote: 
Almost the whole current of legislation in this state in re- 
gard to navigable rivers is adverse to this principle [of 
private ownership to the center of fresh water streams]. . . 
. Had the common law originated on this continent we 
should never have heard of the doctrine that fresh water 
rivers are not navigable above the flow of the tide; nor 
would our courts of justice have been called upon to com- 
promise the interests of the community by sacrificing 
truth to technicality and substance to form. 
The court held that the claimant failed to show title to a wa- 
terfall in the Mohawk River. 
In 1830 and 1850, the Legislature authorized the Commis- 
sioners of the Land Office to convey "lands under the waters 
of navigable rivers or lakes." E.g., Laws 1850, ch. 280, p. 621. 
See People ex rel. Loomis u. Canal  Appraisers, 33 N.Y. 461, 
466 (1865). Inasmuch as there are no navigable in law (i.e., 
tidal) lakes, these enactments make sense only if viewed as a 
legislative recognition and assertion of state title over all lakes 
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that are navigable in fact. There are, of course, "navigable in 
law" rivers, but it would be very peculiar to use the word 
"navigable" in these statutes to mean one thing in relation to 
rivers and an altogether different thing in relation to lakes. 
These statutes therefore also strongly imply a legislative rec- 
ognition and assertion of state title over all rivers that are 
navigable in fact. See id.; but cf. Varick v. Smith, 9 Paige Ch. 
546, 556 (N.Y. Ch. 1842) ("The legislature then should be 
deemed to use the term [navigable] in a legal sense when they 
are applying it to create or describe a legal right."). 
Cf.: 
Moyer u. State of New York, 56 Misc. 2d 549, 551, 289 
N.Y.S.2d 114, 116 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1968). In holding a bay off of 
Lake Ontario to be property of the state, the court wrote: 
"Regarding the title to these lands, there is a presumption 
under the law that lands under navigable waters are the prop- 
erty of the State and the burden is upon the one claiming the 
contrary." The court was referring to lands under Lake Onta- 
rio which is, of course, non-tidal. 
Johnson u. State, 151 A.D. 361, 363-64, 135 N.Y.S. 496, 
498 (3d Dept. 1912) (title to uplands excluded bed of creek, 
where the original royal patent said "[elxcepting Wood Creek 
which is reserved as a common highway for the benefit of the 
public." The later conveyance by the state of the same up- 
lands, after forfeiture by royal patentee on the grounds of 
treason, likewise excluded the creek bed.). 
3.3. Exceptions: Hudson, Mohawk Rivers and 
Boundary Waters - 
3.3.1. Beds of Hudson and Mohawk are Owned by 
the State - The beds of the non-tidal portion of the Hud- 
son and of the Mohawk River have been an exception to the 
general rule in New York that the owner of riparian land on a 
non-tidal navigable river owns to the center. The origins of 
this special treatment were learnedly discussed a t  some length 
in Finch, Pruyn & Co. v. State, 122 Misc. 404, 407-08, 203 
N.Y.S. 165, 168-69 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1924) (Hudson a t  and above 
Glens Falls is navigable in fact), where the court mentioned 
three possibilities: 
1. The original grants along these rivers were made by the 
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Dutch and, therefore, were to be construed under the civil law 
which did not convey the beds of streams. 
2. The English common-law rule (the ebb-and-flow rule) 
was unsuited to our country and, therefore, was not applied to 
these rivers. 
3. The size, location and commercial importance of these 
rivers demanded that they be excluded from the usual rule, an 
exclusion acquiesced in by all. 
Whatever the explanation, the exception is fact. 
In Danes u. State, 219 N.Y. 67, 72-74, 113 N.E. 786, 787- 
88, (1916) (Mohawk), this exception was said to have 
originated in the Dutch colonial practice of retaining the beds 
of the Hudson and Mohawk when making grants to settlers. 
Because New York State is now the sovereign successor to the 
British and Dutch, the state now generally owns the beds of 
these rivers. 
In People ex rel. Loomis u. Canal Appraisers, 33 N.Y. 
461, 499 (1865) (Mohawk), the court concluded that a convey' 
ance of lands bounded by any actually navigable stream, in- 
cluding the Mohawk, would carry only to the bank and not 
the center of the stream, rejecting the English common law 
rule as unsuitable to conditions in New York. [This position 
was later repudiated by the Court of Appeals, which limited 
the Loomis holding to the Mohawk and Hudson Rivers (See 
supra, introduction to this chapter and 5 3.2.1.2.).] 
The state's ownership of the bed of such navigable (in 
law) streams extends up to the high water line. People u. Tib- 
betts, 19 N.Y. 523, 527 (1859) (Hudson at Troy; remanded for 
further evidence as to tidal effects at  Troy). Accord Stewart u. 
Turney, 237 N.Y. 117, 125, 142 N.E. 437, 440 (1923) (dictum). 
See also: 
New York Power & Light Corp. u. State of New York, 
230 A.D. 338,342, 245 N.Y.S. 44,49 (3d Dept. 1930) (Mohawk 
is a public stream; title in state). 
Accord People u. Page, 58 N.Y.S. 239, 241 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1897) (recognizing title to bed of Mohawk in state) reu'd in 
part, 39 A.D. 110, 56 N.Y.S. 834 (3d Dept. 1899). 
Canal Comm'n u. People ex rel. Tibbits, 5 Wend. 423, 
460, 463 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830); 13 Wend. 355 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
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1835), reu'd, 17 Wend. 571, 609 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841) ("not 
only the colonial government but the state authorities have 
considered the bed of the Mohawk 'as belonging to the pub- 
lic") (emphasis added). 
3.3.2. Beds of Hudson and Mohawk Held not 
Owned by the State - Although the beds of the Hudson 
and Mohawk are mostly owned by the state, certain areas of 
the beds passed to private ownership as a result of convey- 
ances which were intended to include the bed. Williams v. 
City of Utica, 217 N.Y. 162, 111 N.E. 468 (1916) (successful 
ejectment action by successor to grantee of bed). "[Tlhe ques- 
tion [is] whether King George having title to the bed of the 
stream did intend to and did convey the same . . . ." Id. a t  
169, 111 N.E. at  470. 
3.3.3. Boundary Waters - To the extent that "our 
freshwater rivers and lakes formed territorial boundaries", the 
English rule assigning streambed ownership to the private ri- 
parian owners is "clearly, inapplicable." Fulton Light, Heat & 
Power Co. u. New York, 200 N.Y. 400, 413, 94 N.E. 199, 202 
(1911). 
"The title to the beds of boundary line streams, a jus 
priuatum, is in the State [sic] as sovereign in trust for the 
people and so remains unless specifically granted." People u. 
New York & Ontario Power Co., 219 A.D. 114, 116, 219 N.Y.S. 
497, 500 (3d Dept. 1927) (St. Lawrence River). 
See also: 
Moyer u. State of New York, 56 Misc. 2d 549, 551, 289 
N.Y.S.2d 114, 116 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1968) (bay off of Lake Ontario 
is property of the state). 
Hawkins v. State, 54 Misc. 2d 847, 853, 283 N.Y.S.2d 615, 
621 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1967) (East Bay, a portion of Lake Ontario). 
Niagara Falls Power Co. u. Water Power and Control 
Comm'n, 267 N.Y. 265, 270, 196 N.E. 51, 53 (1935). 
Long Sault Deu. Co. v. Kennedy, 212 N.Y. 1, 7, 105 N.E. 
849, 851 (1914) (St. Lawrence River). 
Gouverneur u. The National Ice Co., 134 N.Y. 355, 359, 
31 N.E. 865, 867 (1892) (noting an exception for "our large 
fresh water lakes or inland seas" and "those lakes and streams 
which form the natural boundaries between us and foreign 
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nations"). 
I n  Re Commn's of State Reservation, 37 Hun. 537, 547 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 5th Dept. 1885) (Niagara River). 
Champlain & St. L. R.R. u. Valentine, 19 Barb. 484, 489- 
92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853) (Lake Champlain). 
Canal Appraisers u. People ex rel. Tibbits, 17 Wend. 571, 
623 (N.Y. Ct. for the Correction of Errors 1836) (dictum). 
3.4. Interpretation of Deeds - In general, grants 
bounded by tidal waters carry only to the high water marks, 
unless the language clearly indicates a different intent. Tif- 
fany u. Town of Oyster Bay, 209 N.Y. 1, 9, 102 N.E. 585, 587 
(1913); Sage u. Mayor, 154 N.Y. 61, 69-70, 47 N.E. 1096, 1098 
(1897) (hence, the rule that lands under tidal waters are gen- 
erally not deemed to have passed into private ownership). See 
supra § 2.2. By contrast, grants bounded by non-tidal streams 
are usually deemed to carry to the center of the stream. The 
weight of more recent authority holds that deeds to lands 
bounding all but the largest freshwater lakes and ponds carry 
to the center of the lake or pond, unless otherwise expressed. 
The main interpretive distinction made by the cases is 
between grants that "touch" the water and grants which ex- 
tend only to a point on dry land a t  the water margin. Only 
those grants which "touch" the water are deemed to extend 
under it and convey submerged lands as well. 
3.4.1. Grant Framed so as to Touch the Water: Ti- 
tle to Center - "If the boundary touches the water or is 
along the water or by the water, and not on dry land, the pre- 
sumption remains that title is carried to the center of the 
river or pond." White u. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 254 N.Y. 152, 
157, 172 N.E. 452, 454 (1930). 
In Brunt Lake Shores, Znc. u. Barton, 61 Misc. 2d 902, 
905, 307 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1009-10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970), the 
court wrote: 
A description using the words 'low water mark', in the ab- 
sence of an express reservation, carries title to the center 
of the lake or pond . . . [but since the grantor] conveyed 
only to high water mark [the grantee] only acquired title 
in said premises to high water mark, which precluded title 
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in and to any land beyond high water mark. 
In White u. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 254 N.Y. 152, 156, 172 
N.E. 452, 453 (1930), the court stated: 
If the parties mean to exclude the land under water [of 
small non-navigable lakes and ponds], they should do so 
by express exception; the restriction ought to be framed 
in very plain and express words. . . . A description carry- 
ing the boundary 'by the shore' is such an express restric- 
tion; likewise 'to the bank'. On the other hand, 'along said 
pond,' . . . carried title to the center of the pond. [Cita- 
tions omitted.] [In sum, a] description . . . so framed as to 
touch the water of the river or pond, carries title to the 
center thereof. 
Id. a t  157, 172 N.E. a t  454 (emphasis added). The court held 
that the deed to shore lands of Rockland Lake included title 
to the bed. 
In Stewart u. Turney, 237 N.Y. 117, 121, 142 N.E. 437, 
438-39 (1923), the court said of the rule that "the grantee 
takes title to the center of the highway or to the thread of [a 
non-tidal] stream or lake. A presumption founded originally 
upon the assumed intent of the parties, i t  has now become a 
rule of property." Still, however, the presumption may be 
"negatived by express words" or a clear description excluding 
the bed lands. 
The rule of the common law of this state (enlarging or 
extending that of England) that the title to the bed of 
navigable rivers, not tidal, passed to the grantees of the 
adjacent banks has not heretofore been applied to the 
[royal] grants of the banks of the Hudson and Mohawk 
rivers. 
Danes u. State, 219 N.Y. 67, 71, 113 N.E. 786, 787 (1916). 
However, in interpreting an English conveyance of lands 
described as "lying and being . . . on both sides of the Mo- 
hawk river" (emphasis added) and then described more par- 
ticularly by metes and bounds, the court in Williams u. City 
Heinonline - -  6 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 503 1988-1989 
504 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6 
of Utica, 217 N.Y. 162, 170-71, 111 N.E. 468 (1916), held that 
the conveyance was intended to include the bed of the river, 
stating: "[Tlhis general location of the tract [by reference to 
the river] ought not be construed as overruling definite and 
exact boundary lines or as excluding land which was included 
within those boundary lines." Id. at  470. 
In Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. u. New York, 200 
N.Y. 401, 416, 94 N.E. 199, 204 (1911), the court stated that, 
presuming a consideration was paid, grants from the state 
should not be construed "with any extraordinary strictness as 
against the grantee." In considering the effect of a grant made 
by the state, therefore, it applied the "old and well-settled 
rule" that "where a grant has no other boundary on the river 
side but the stream itself, . . . the legal presumption is that it 
was intended to convey to the middle of the stream." The 
grant from the state which the court had before it described 
the boundary as running "to the said river and then up and 
along the same." This language, the court held, conveyed a 
tract of land "bounded . . . by the center of the Oswego river." 
By contrast, "a boundary line, which is described as 'along the 
shore', or 'along the bank,' of a fresh-water stream would not 
extend the grant to the center." Id. at  417, 94 N.E. a t  204. 
In Varick u. Smith, 9 Paige Ch. 546 (N.Y. Ch. 1842), in 
passing on a map description contained in a deed from the 
state, the Vice Chancellor noted that the lot conveyed was, on 
the map, "laid down and delineated as lying adjacent and ex- 
tending to the Oswego River." Accordingly, the Vice Chancel- 
lor wrote, it "must be taken as though the premises were de- 
scribed by words in the grant itself, as extending to, and 
bounded on the river." Id. a t  549. The court held that the 
granted lands were deemed to include the bed of the river. 
Luce v. Carley, 24 Wend. 450, 452-53 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1840) (Onondaga River: concern that, if grants of stream-side 
lands were not construed to include the lands under water as 
well, "water gores would be multiplied by the thousands along 
the inland streams, small and great."). 
See also: 
Hartwood Syndicate, Inc. u. Passaic Valley Council, Boy 
Scouts of America, 80 A.D.2d 871, 872, 457 N.Y.S.2d 16, 17 
Heinonline - -  6 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 504 1988-1989 
19891 PUBLIC RIGHTS 505 
(2d Dept. 1981) (Beaver Dam PondIReservoir in private 
ownership). 
Town of Guilderland v. Swansoiz, 29 A.D.2d 717, 718, 286 
N.Y.S.2d 425, 427 (3d Dept. 1968), aff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 872, 249 
N.E.2d 467, 301 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1969). 
Meadvin u. State, 22 A.D.2d 326, 327, 255 N.Y.S.2d 357, 
359 (4th Dept. 1965) (Onondaga Creek). 
Waters of White Lake, Inc. u. Fricke, 282 A.D. 333, 336, 
123 N.Y.S.2d 400, 403 (3d Dept. 1953), aff'd, 308 N.Y. 899, 
126 N.E.2d 568 (1955) 
Seneca Nation of Indians u. Knight, 23 N.Y. 498 (1861) 
(concern about "water gores"). 
Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb. 102, 125 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1862) (Cazenovia Lake). 
Lowndes v. Dickerson, 34 Barb. 586, 592 (Sup. Gen. T. 
1861) (dicta). 
3.4.2. Grant Extending to a Point or Line on Dry 
Land: Low Water Line -"[I]f the description runs the ti- 
tle along dry land, such as the bank or the shore, there is an 
express restriction which excludes or reserves title in the river 
or pond." (emphasis added). White u. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 
254 N.Y. 152, 157, 172 N.E. 452, 454 (1930). Accordingly, the 
private ownership extends only to the low water line. 
In Carlino u. Barton, 76 Misc. 2d 240, 242, 349 N.Y.S.2d 
535, 539 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973), the court held that a deed 
bounding land "along the shores" of a small, inland fresh- 
water lake conveys title to the low water line. 
In People u. System Properties, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 330, 141 
N.E.2d 429, 160 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1957), the court had before it 
an English conveyance of lands "along the Banks" of the Ti- 
conderoga River. In interpreting this conveyance, the court 
observed: 
[Alccording to the English common law as of about 1764 
the owner of land on each side of a non-tidal river . . . 
owned to the center of the stream and if he owned land 
on both sides he owned the whole river unless his grant 
specifically and in terms excluded the bed . . . . [There 
is] no real difference in this respect between the English 
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and American colonial law and the modern law of New 
York State. 
Id. a t  341, 141 N.E.2d a t  433, 160 N.Y.S.2d a t  865 (emphasis 
added). However, the court concluded that "running the 
boundary line along the bank of the stream [as in this case] 
results in an exclusion of the land under water." Id. at  342, 
141 N.E.2d a t  433, 160 N.Y.S.2d a t  865 (emphasis added). 
Halsey u. McCormack, 13 N.Y. 296 (1855) (grant to 
"bank" of a creek goes to the low water mark in order to se- 
cure use of the water to the riparian owner). 
Accord Child u. Starr, 4 Hill 369, 376 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1842); Starr v. Child, 5 Denio 599, 602-03 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1846). ("A grant, therefore, which is bounded by the shore of 
a freshwater river, conveys the land to the water's edge, at  
low-water. ") 
See also: 
Meaduin u. State, 22 A.D.2d 326, 328, 255 N.Y.S.2d 357, 
360 (4th Dept. 1965) (Onondaga Creek). 
Johnson u. State, 151 A.D. 361, 363, 135 N.Y.S. 496, 498 
(3d Dept. 1912) (royal patent said "Excepting Wood Creek 
which is reserved as a common highway for the benefit of the 
public"). 
Geneva u. Henson, 195 N.Y. 447, 88 N.E. 1104 (1909), 
aff'd, 140 A.D. 49, 124 N.Y.S. 588 (4th Dept. 1918). 
3.4.3. Exceptional Cases - "The rule is well estab- 
lished that nothing passes in such grants [of lands on both 
sides of the Hudson River] . . . by implication, or except such 
as is expressed in unequivocal language . . . ." West Virginia 
Pulp & Paper Co. u. Peck, 189 A.D. 286, 293, 178 N.Y.S. 663, 
668 (3d Dept. 1919), modified, 190 A.D. 891, 178 N.Y.S. 663 
(1919). "The Queen Anne patent . . . clearly did not have the 
effect of conveying the bed of the river." Id. a t  670, 178 
N.Y.S.2d at  670. 
In Wheeler u. Spinola, 54 N.Y. 377, 385 (1873), the court 
wrote that "a boundary upon . . . [a freshwater pond] does not 
carry title to its center but only to the low-water mark. Such 
is the rule as to boundaries upon natural ponds and lakes," 
noting that the rule applied to ordinary freshwater streams 
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would not apply to a fresh water pond. 
In People ex rel. Loomis u. Canal Appraisers, 33 N.Y. 
461, 480, 500 (1865), the Court of Appeals paraphrased and 
approved the earlier statement by Senator Beardsley in Canal 
Appraisers v. People ex rel. Tibbits, 17 Wend. 571, 612 (N.Y. 
Ch. 1836): 
Where patents have been bounded upon navigable fresh 
water rivers in this state, and nothing appears from the 
grant that the state intended to part with the bed of the 
river, the patentee shall not by an implied grant take the 
river to the exclusion of the state, where the state wishes 
to use it for public purposes. 
Remember, however, that Loomis and its line of reasoning - 
rejecting application of the English common law rule in New 
York - was confined to the Hudson and Mohawk rivers in 
Smith u. Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 481-82 (1883). 
3.5. Private Title by Prescription or Adverse 
Possession - may be acquired in state-owned lands. This 
includes lands under non-tidal waters. The general rule is that 
if title could be acquired to the particular lands by a grant 
from the state, then title can be acquired by adverse posses- 
sion (a "lost grant") as well. As already described in $$ 3.2 
and 3.4, supra, the state not only can grant title to lands 
under fresh waters, but there is a presumption that it does 
make such grants whenever it conveys the adjoining uplands. 
The question addressed in the cases below is distinct from the 
question of whether the public right of passage could be ex- 
tinguished by prescription or adverse possession. See infra $ 
4.6. 
In Arnold's Inn, Inc. u. Morgan, 63 Misc. 2d 279, 285, 310 
N.Y.S.2d 541, 548 (Sup. Ct. 1970), modified, 35 A.D.2d 987, 
317 N.Y.S.2d 989 (2d Dept. 1970), the court said, in respect to 
lands under the tidal waters of Manhasset Bay: "The land in- 
volved herein, however, is alienable [citations omitted] and 
therefore, since the Town could divest itself of title by an ex- 
press grant it could also lose title by prescription." 
But cf. Hawkins v. State, 54 Misc. 2d 847, 853, 283 
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N.Y.S.2d 615, 621 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1967) ("the State's sovereign 
title [to the bed of Lake Ontario] is inalienable except by 
grant"). 
In People u. System Properties, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 330, 343, 
141 N.E.2d 429, 434, 160 N.Y.S.2d 859, 866 (1957), the Court 
of Appeals stated that, by maintenance of a dam on a state- 
owned streambed, title to the streambed could be acquired by 
adverse possession because (I) "this dam standing on a rocky 
ledge in the river is a t  a place where its existence . . . inter- 
feres with no public use," and (2) the state itself had conveyed 
other nearby portions of the same river. 
Nevertheless, the court in System Properties wrote, 
"[tlhe rule appropriate to some situations is that a grant to a 
private individual may not be presumed or adverse possession 
adjudicated as to lands theretofore appropriated to a public 
use by the state since such lands are inalienable (Burbank u. 
Fay, 65 N.Y. 57, 66 (1875) et seq.)." Id. at  342-43, 141 N.E.2d 
at  434, 160 N.Y.S.2d at  860. 
In Burbank u. Fay, 65 N.Y. 57 (1875), the court wrote 
that: "Where no express grant can be allowed, the law will not 
resort to the fiction of an implied grant so as to create a pre- 
scriptive right . . . ." Id. a t  67. "The principles thus laid down 
as to highways on the land, are plainly applicable to navigable 
waters." Id. at  71. The court held that no prescriptive right to 
canal waters, by analogy to natural streams existed. 
See also: 
Carlino u. Barton, 76 Misc. 2d 240, 243, 349 N.Y.S.2d 535, 
540 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973), in which the court found title by 
prescription to the area between the low and high water line 
on a small, inland lake. 
New York u. Wilson & Co., 278 N.Y. 86, 15 N.E.2d 408 
(1938) (lands under margins of tidal waters were held to be 
alienable). 
Wheeler u. Spinola, 54 N.Y. 377, 387 (1873), in which the 
court refused to find adverse possession of underwater lands 
where the "land was never inclosed . . . never cultivated and 
never possessed except . . . temporary occupancy for such an 
unimportant purpose [cutting thatch once a year], really 
nothing but trespasses repeated from year to year." 
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3.6. Title to Lake Beds - The ownership of lakebeds, 
like title to streambeds, depends fundamentally on the history 
of conveyances from the root of title down to the present. In 
litigated cases, lake bed title is generally found to be held by 
the private riparian owners, except in the case of large lakes, 
where title has generally been adjudicated to be in the state. 
In Granger u. City of Canandaigua, 257 N.Y. 126, 177 
N.E. 394 (1931), a dispute over lake bed title, the court said: 
The title to the bed of large lakes [George, Seneca, Ca- 
yuga, Oneida] remains in the state; of the small lakes in 
private ownership. Between the two groups come lakes 
like Onondaga, Otsego and Canandaigua. Where shall we 
place them? . . . Except as applied to comparatively small 
and narrow bodies of water, resembling rivers, rather than 
lakes, it seems . . . contrary to our institutions to say that 
fresh water lakes are the subject of private ownership. 
Id. at  130-31, 77 N.E. a t  396. 
The court characterized its decision in Granger as a 
"practical construction" of the original conveyance of the al- 
leged private title to the lake bed, viz. a 1786 grant from New 
York to Massachusetts known as the "Treaty of Hartford." 
Id. The court held that "title to the bed of Canandaigua Lake 
is in the State of New York in trust for all the people." Id. a t  
132, 77 N.E. a t  296. (The plaintiffs had sued to restrain the 
city from entering upon and filling the lake bed in violation of 
their alleged private title rights.) 
In White v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 254 N.Y. 152, 156-57, 
172 N.E. 452 (1930), the court held that a deed to shore lands 
of Rockland Lake included title to the bed. "If the parties 
mean to exclude the land under water [of small non-navigable 
lakes and ponds], they should do so by express exception." Id. 
a t  156, 172 N.E. at 453. " [A] description . . . so framed as to 
touch the water of the river or pond, carries title to the center 
thereof." Id. a t  156, 172 N.E. a t  454 (emphasis added). 
In Stewart v. Turney, 237 N.Y. 117, 142 N.E. 437 (1923), 
the court wrote: "Were it necessary we would hold, however, 
that with regard to a grant of land on Cayuga lake an excep- 
tion should be made to the common-law rule [presumptively 
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extending riparian ownership to the center of a lake] . . . ." Id. 
a t  123, 142 N.E. at  439. "[Wle hold that under a grant from 
the state the grantee took to the low-water mark on Lake Ca- 
yuga." Id. at  130, 142 N.E. at  442. See also New York State 
Water Resources Comm'n u. Liberman, 37 A.D.2d 484, 488, 
326 N.Y.S.2d 284, 288 (3d Dept. 1971) (The bed of Cayuga 
Lake "is held by the State in its sovereign capacity in trust for 
the people of the state."). 
In Gouverneur u. National Ice Co., 134 N.Y. 355, 359, 31 
N.E. 865, 867 (1892), it was said: "Natural ponds and small 
lakes are private property. They pass by grant of land in 
which they are included." The court held that the riparian 
owners of Croton Pond (about 45 acres) own to the center of 
the pond. 
In People ex rel. Burnham u. Jones, 112 N.Y. 597,606,20 
N.E. 577, 579 (1889), the court wrote: "[Ilt is conceded by 
both parties that [private ownership] extends only to the 
high-water mark on inland seas or large navigable bodies of 
water like those of Lake Ontario [citation omitted] and that 
the title to all lands beyond high-water mark or under water 
is in the state." 
In Smith u. Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463 (1883), an action to 
restrain the diversion of waters, the court stated in its discus- 
sion that the "property to the soil under the waters of Hem- 
lock Lake [7 miles long x Y2 mile wide] were acquired by and 
belong to the riparian owners" by virtue of the grant, known 
as the Treaty of Hartford, from New York to Massachusetts 
in 1786. Id. a t  476. 
Although the court (1) "stated in passing" that the Eng- 
lish rule as to freshwater titles is "inapplicable to the vast 
freshwater lakes or inland seas of this country or the streams 
forming the boundary line of states," Id. a t  479, and (2) "af- 
firmed" that the term navigable water "has by common con- 
sent a more enlarged signification in this country and is here 
held to mean all such waters as are actually navigable, 
whether fresh or salt," Id. a t  479-80, it nevertheless concluded 
that "the decided preponderance of judicial authority in the 
State favors the application of the [English] common-law rule 
to the navigable waters of this State." Id. a t  481. The court 
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limited the Loomis case to its facts (i.e., the Mohawk), see 
supra, 5 3.2.1.2. , and the bed of Hemlock Lake was declared 
to belong to its riparian owners. Id. a t  482. 
In Crooked Lake Nau. Co. u. Keuka Nau. Co., 4 N.Y. St. 
Rep. 380, 383 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1887) (Keuka Lake navigable), 
the court wrote: "The rule is that riparian owners of lands ad- 
joining fresh water, non-navigable and navigable streams, and 
small lakes, within the state, take title to the land underneath 
the water abutting upon their premises." 
In Brunt Lake Shores, Inc. u. Barton, 61 Misc. 2d 902, 
904-05, 307 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1009-10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970), the 
court wrote: "[A] conveyance bounded by a small inland lake 
or pond carries title to the center or thread of the current un- 
less there is expression to the contrary." If, however, the gran- 
tor "conveyed only to high water mark . . . [the grantee] only 
acquired title in said premises to high water mark, which pre- 
cluded title in and to any land beyond high water mark." 
In Hawkins u. State, 54 Misc. 2d 847, 852-53, 283 
N.Y.S.2d 615, 621 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1967), the court stated that to 
prove title to a portion of a bay off Lake Ontario, the claimant 
must show that "the State had relinquished, alienated or 
transferred its ownership by express grant . . . the State's sov- 
ereign title is inalienable except by grant." (emphasis added) 
In Ledyard u. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb. 102 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1862), the- bed of Cazenovia Lake was held to be the property 
of the abutting riparians. 
But cf. Wheeler u. Spinola, 54 N.Y. 377, 385 (1873), in 
which the court stated that the rule applied to ordinary fresh- 
water streams would not apply to a freshwater pond, stating: 
"A boundary upon [a freshwater pond] does not carry title to 
its center but only to the low-water mark. Such is the rule as 
to boundaries upon natural ponds and lakes." [Later called 
obiter dictum in Gouverneur u. National Ice Co., 134 N.Y. 
355, 361, 31 N.E. 865, 867 (1892).] 
See also Canal Comm'rs u. People ex rel. Tibbits, 5 
Wend. 423, 447 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830), which provided the fol- 
lowing extended discussion: 
The principle [that private title presumptively goes to the 
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center of freshwater bodies] itself does not appear to be 
sufficiently broad to embrace our large fresh water lakes, 
or inland seas, which are wholly unprovided for by the 
common law of England. . . .(emphasis in original) [Olur 
own local law appears to have assigned the shores down 
to the ordinary low water mark to the riparian owners, 
and the beds of the lakes with the islands therein to the 
public. 
(emphasis added). [Note: This quoted language was denomi- 
nated "purely dictum," but followed, in Stewart u. Turney, 
237 N.Y. 117, 123, 142 N.E. 437, 439, (1923).] The issue in 
Tibbits was title to a waterfall in the Mohawk River. 
In 1815, the Legislature authorized the Commissioners of 
the Land Office to convey "lands under water on navigable 
lakes." 1815 N.Y. Laws CXCIX. See People ex rel. Loomis u. 
Canal Appraisers, 33 N.Y. 461, 466 (1865); Since there are no 
lakes that are "navigable in law" (i.e., tidal), this enactment 
makes sense only if viewed as a legislative recognition and as- 
sertion of state title over all lakes that are navigable in fact. 
Other Cases and Authorities are: 
Hartwood Syndicate, Inc. u. Passaic Valley Council, Boy 
Scouts, 80 A.D.2d 871, 872, 437 N.Y.S.2d 16, 17 (2d Dept. 
1981) (Beaver Dam Pond/Reservoir in private ownership). 
Allen u. Potter, 64 Misc. 2d 938, 938-39, 316 N.Y.S.2d 
790, 792 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970), aff'd, 37 A.D.2d 691, 323 
N.Y.S.2d 409 (4th Dept. 1971) (title on Canandaigua Lake ex- 
tends to low water line). 
Town of Guilderland u. Swanson, 29 A.D.2d 717, 718, 286 
N.Y.S.2d 425, 426-27 (3d Dept. 1968), aff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 872, 
249 N.E.2d 467, 301 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1969) (recognizing rules of 
construction applicable to streams (see supra § 3.4) as appli- 
cable to lakes). 
Knight u. Ciarlone, 200 N.Y.S.2d 805 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1959) (title to lands on Lake George extend to low water line). 
Waters of White Lake u. Fricke, 282 A.D. 333, 336, 123 
N.Y.S.2d 400, 402-03, (3d Dept. 1953), aff'd, 308 N.Y. 899, 126 
N.E.2d 568 (recognizing rule "a conveyance of land bounded 
by a small inland lake or pond usually carries title to the 
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center or the thread of the current unless there is expression 
to the contrary."). 
Ransom u. Shaeffer, 153 Misc. 199, 274 N.Y.S. 570 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1934), modified, 243 A.D. 858, 279 N.Y.S. 720 (4th 
Dept. 1935) (title to lands on Lake Ontario extends to low 
water line). 
Shandalee Camp, Inc. u. Rosenthal, 133 Misc. 502, 505, 
233 N.Y.S. 11, 14-15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1929) (Shandelee Lake, 
4000 feet long and 1,200 feet wide is of a sort that is "subject 
to private ownership"). 
Moore u. Day, 199 A.D. 76, 191 N.Y.S. 731 (1921), aff'd, 
235 N.Y. 554, 139 N.E. 732 (1923) (bed of Lake Champlain is 
owned by state). 
Champlain & St. L. R.R. u. Valentine, 19 Barb 484, 489- 
92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853) (grant of lands bounded by Lake 
Champlain extends to the low water line). 
See also: 
4 Op. N.Y. Comp. 412 (1948) (each case depends on its 
particular facts). 
Colson, Title to Beds of Lakes in New York, 9 Cornell 
L.Q. 159, 288 (1924). 
Andrews, Lands Under Water in New York, 16 Cornell 
L.Q. 277 (1931). 
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Chapter IV. 
THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT OF PASSAGE ON 
STREAMS 
4. The Public's Right of Passage on Streams - 
While ownership of the beds of non-tidal streams is usually 
deemed to be in the private riparian owners, the private own- 
ership is subject to a public right of passage if the stream is 
generally usable for such purpose. This "servitude of the pub- 
lic interest" has been consistently recognized from the earliest 
days of New York navigation law. Palmer u. Mulligan, 3 Cai. 
R. 307, 319 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). "The Hudson at  Stillwater," 
wrote Chancellor Kent in his seminal dictum, "is capable of 
being held and enjoyed as private property, but it is, notwith- 
standing, to be deemed a public highway for public uses . . . . 9 ,  
Id. (emphasis added). In other words, as the Court of Appeals 
later reaffirmed: "The right of property in the soil or bed of a 
navigable river or arm of the sea, and the right to use the wa- 
ters for the purposes of navigation, are entirely separate and 
distinct." People u. Vanderbilt, 26 N.Y. 287, 292 (1863) (em- 
phasis added). 
4.1. The English Common Law - held that "title to 
the soil of the sea, or of the arms of the sea, or of tidal rivers, 
was in the crown, subject to an easement in favor of the public 
for passage, or transportation; while fresh water rivers be- 
longed to the owners of their banks, also, subject to the use of 
the public as navigable highways." Fulton Light, Heat & 
Power Co. u. New York, 200 N.Y. 401, 412, 94 N.E. 199, 202 
(1911) (emphasis added). Whether title to the bed was in the 
crown or in the private riparian owners, there was never any 
"distinction against the public right of passage and transpor- 
tation." Id. 
Thus, "[wlhether salt, or fresh, water streams, if they 
were large enough to be capable of common passage and thus, 
in fact, were navigable, they were regarded as common high- 
ways, which might not be impeded . . . . A stream to be exclu- 
sively owned by the riparian owner, must be too small to be 
navigable in fact." Id. (emphasis added). 
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4.2. T h e  Public Right  of Passage on N e w  York  
S t r e a m s  - is deeply rooted. I t  is rare in New York to find a 
judicial statement that stream beds can be privately owned 
without the further statement, immediately appended, that 
the private ownership is subject to the public right of passage. 
4.2.1. Cases  Affirming the Public Right  of Pas- 
sage on  S t r e a m s  - typically refer to the public right as an 
"easement" or "right of way" for "travel" or "passage" as on a 
"highway". 
"A public right on a stream is a right of travel as on a 
public highway." People ex rel. New York Cent. R.R. u. State 
Tax Comm'n, 258 A.D. 356, 361, 16 N.Y.S.2d 812, 817 (3d 
Dept. 1940), aff'd, 284 N.Y. 616, 29 N.E.2d 932 (1940) (Iona 
Bay, Doodletown Creek and Popolopen Creek are navigable in 
fact). 
"A public right on a stream is the right of travel as on a 
public highway." People ex rel. New York, 0. & W. Ry. u. 
State Tax Comm'n, 116 Misc. 774, 775, 191 N.Y.S. 464, 466 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921) (Susquehanna River). 
The proprietary interest of the riparian owner is 
subordinate the public easement of passage and the state 
may be regarded as a trustee of a special public servitude 
. . . [Tlhe legislature may direct the performance of acts 
by state officers, which tend to promote the public right 
of passage and transportation, without subjecting the 
state to liability. 
Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. u. Neu York, 200 N.Y. 400, 
418, 94 N.E. 199, 204 (1911). 
"The public has an easement in such waters for the pur- 
poses of travel as upon a public highway. . . ." Crooked Lake 
Nau. Co. u. Keuka Nau. Co., 4 N.Y. St. Rep. 380, 383 (5th 
Dept. 1887), aff'd, 22 N.E. 1126 (1889) (Keuka Lake navigable 
by small vessels). 
"The common right of navigation in navigable rivers of 
the State [sic] is in the people, and the equality of their right 
to use them for that purpose cannot be abridged except by . . . 
the legislature." In  Re Comm'rs of State Reservation, 37 Hun. 
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537, 550 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1885). 
"[Tlhe rights and interests of the public, such as fishing, 
ferrying and transportation, are preserved in all navigable wa- 
ters by the inherent and inalienable attributes of the sover- 
eign . . . ." Smith v. City of Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 480 
(1883). 
"[Tlhis ownership of the citizen is of the whole river, uiz. 
the soil and the water of the river, except that in his river 
where boats, rafts, etc. may be floated to market, the public 
have a right of way or easement." Smith v. Rochester, 92 N.Y. 
463, 479 (1883) (approvingly quoting Judge Cowen's footnote 
in Ex parte Jennings, 6 Cow. 518, 543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826)). 
As early as the year 1802, an act was passed declaring the 
waters of certain streams, therein mentioned, to be public 
highways. . . . Numerous acts of a similar character are 
found in our statute books, containing restrictions upon 
the use of streams declared to be public highways, and of 
the waters thereof. 
People ex rel. Loomis v. Canal Appraisers, 33 N.Y. 461, 467 
(1865). 
"[Tlhe doctrine of riparian ownership does not give a 
right to the bed of the stream, and the use of the water in- 
compatible with the superior rights of the public, for the pur- 
poses of navigation and commerce." Varick u. Smith, 9 Paige 
Ch. 547, 552 (N.Y. Ch. 1842). 
The private "right of property [in submerged lands] is in 
all respects analogous to the property in fee of any land sub- 
ject to a public or private right of way, or any similar ease- 
ment." Commissioners v. Kempshall, 26 Wend. 404, 413 (N.Y. 
1841). 
"The public right is one of passage . . . as in a common 
highway. I t  is called by the cases an easement." Ex parte Jen- 
nings, 6 Cow. 518, 527-28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826). 
"Individuals who occupy the adjoining banks may use the 
waters for their own emolument, so far only as it can be done 
without any material interruption of the public use." Shaw v. 
Crawford, 10 Johns. 236, 238 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813). 
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See also: 
"Regardless of who owns legal title to the underlying 
land, a navigable waterway is a form of public highway." 
Town of Hempstead u. Oceanside Small Craft Marina Inc., 
64 Misc. 2d 4, 6, 311 N.Y.S.2d 668, 671 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970), 
rev'd on other grounds, 38 A.D.2d 263, 328 N.Y.S.2d 894 (2d 
Dept. 1972), aff'd, 32 N.Y.2d 859 (1973). 
Lehigh Valley R.R. u. Canal Bd., 146 A.D. 151, 159, 130 
N.Y.S. 978, 983 (4th Dept. 1911), modified, 204 N.Y. 471, 97 
N.E. 964 (1912). 
4.2.2. The Exceptional Lake Cases - There are sev- 
eral cases which appear to limit boating on small lakes to the 
owners of the lake bottom, each being entitled to use only the 
surface area above the portion of lake bottom actually owned. 
I t  appears to be assumed in these cases that the lakes in ques- 
tion are non-navigable, even though they may be usable by 
small boats. Perhaps significantly, the lakes in question do not 
appear to have been ones which connect with other waterways 
and, being more or less surrounded by private land, they 
would not permit a boater to "navigate" from or to any place 
in particular; they are, in that sense, entirely different from 
"navigable" streams. See Fairchild u. Kraemer, 11 A.D.2d 
232, 235, 204 N.Y.S.2d 823, 826 (2d Dept. 1960) ("considera- 
tion may be given to the existence or absence of termini a t  
and from which the public may enter and leave said 
waterway"). 
Apart from the distinction based on an absence of ter- 
mini, the exceptional lake cases appear to be irreconcilable 
with the general common-law principles, which they neither 
cite nor attempt to distinguish. The cases are: Mix u. Tice, 
164 Misc. 261, 267, 298 N.Y.S. 441, 448 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937); 
Shandalee Camp, Inc. v. Rosenthal, 133 Misc. 502, 233 N.Y.S. 
11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1929); Calkins v. Hart, 219 N.Y. 145, 113 
N.E. 785 (1916) (trespass to take ice over riparian neighbor's 
portion of lake); Commonwealth Water Co. u. Brunner, 175 
A.D. 153, 161 N.Y.S. 794 (2d Dept. 1916); and Tripp u. 
Richter, 158 A.D. 136, ,139, 142 N.Y.S. 563, 565 (3d Dept. 
1913). See contra, Smith v. Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 479-80 
(1883) (dictum); Crooked Lake Nav. Co. u. Keuka Nau. Co., 4 
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N.Y. St. Rep. 380, 383 (5th Dept. 1887), aff'd, 22 N.E. 1126 
(1889) ("The public has an easement in such waters for the 
purposes of travel as upon a public highway. . . ."); See also, 
Waters of White Lake, Inc. u. Fricke, 282 A.D. 333, 123 
N.Y.S.2d 400 (3d Dept. 1953), affJd, 308 N.Y. 899, 126 N.E.2d 
568 (1955); and Ten Eyck u. Town of Warwick, 75 Hun. 562, 
567 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1894) (stating, in effect, that Greenwood 
Lake "is in no legal or just sense of the term navigable 
water"). 
4.3. Private Lands Which Are Subject to Public 
Right of Passage - are those which are passed over by 
streams or other waters that are "navigable in fact". The cases 
do not define any particular outer limit (such as the high 
water mark) to which the easement for public passage ex- 
tends, though it appears to apply a t  least to those lands 
within the lines of high water. 
4.3.1. The Requirement of "Navigability in Fact" 
- In order for a waterbody to be subject to the public's right 
of passage, it must be "navigable in fact". See supra $ 2.3. 
"The distinguishing test between those rivers which are en- 
tirely private property, and those which are private property 
subject to the public use and enjoyment, consists in the fact, 
whether they are susceptible, or not, of use as common pas- 
sage for the public." People v. Platt, 17 Johns. 195, 211 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1819). 
A person's "right to navigate and anchor his boat in [an 
artificially dredged] basin depends upon whether, prior to the 
aforesaid dredgings, the creek which traversed the area was 
navigable in fact . . . ." Fairchild v. Kraemer, 11 A.D.2d 232, 
235, 204 N.Y.S.2d 823,825 (2d Dept. 1960) (action by the bed- 
owner for trespass). 
"The servitude of privately owned lands forming the 
banks and bed of a stream to the interest of navigation is a 
natural servitude confined, to such streams as in their ordi- 
nary and natural condition are navigable in fact." People ex 
rel. New York, 0. & W. Ry. u. State Tax Comm'n, 116 Misc. 
774, 775, 191 N.Y.S. 464, 466 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921) (emphasis 
added) (Susquehanna River). However, the court later added: 
"The capacity to float logs, singly or together, to run rafts 
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however small, gives to all the public this easement . . . . " Id.  
at  776, 191 N.Y.S. at  467. 
"A stream, to be exclusively owned by the riparian owner, 
must be too small to be navigable, in fact." Fulton Light, 
Heat & Power Co. u. New York, 200 N.Y. 400, 412, 94 N.E. 
199, 202 (1911). 
"[Rlivers of sufficient magnitude and capacity for naviga- 
tion are public highways, and . . . [the rights of private owners 
are] subject to the easement of the public, which they cannot 
lawfully interrupt." In  Re Comm'r of State Reservation, 37 
Hun. 537, 545 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1885). 
"[Wlhere boats, rafts, etc. may be floated to market, the 
public have a right of way or easement." Smith u. Rochester, 
92 N.Y. 463,479 (1883) (quoting with approval Judge Cowen's 
footnote in Ex parte Jennings, 6 Cow. 518, 543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1826)). 
In Morgan v. King, 35 N.Y. 454 (1866), it was held that 
stream users would have no action against another riparian 
owner for obstructing a stream which, without artificial im- 
provements, was incapable of transporting, in a condition fit 
for market, the products of the forest, mines, or agriculture 
along its banks because the stream was not, in its natural 
state, a public highway. 
See also Brant Lake Shores, Inc. v. Barton, 61 Misc. 2d 
902, 907, 307 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970), which 
considered the effect of a legislative declaration that certain 
stream and lake waters are "public highways for the purpose 
of floating logs, timber and lumber down those streams . . . . 9 ,  
The court said: "nor does . . . [the enactment] give anyone a 
greater right to use the waters of Brant Lake than one had 
prior to such designation." Id.  
4.3.2. Physical Extent of the Public Right - Pri- 
vate ownership on tidal waters generally runs only to the high 
water line and, correspondingly, the public right of passage 
and use likewise runs from the tidal waterbody itself to the 
high water line. E.g., Tucci u. Salzhauer, 40 A.D.2d 712, 713, 
336 N.Y.S.2d 721, 723 (2d Dept. 1972), aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 854, 
307 N.E.2d 256, 352 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1973); I n  re City of New 
York, 216 N.Y. 67, 110 N.E. 176 (1915). The high water line 
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plays no similar key role in demarcating the usual ownership 
boundaries on non-tidal waters. See supra, 5 3.2. The New 
York courts have, however, generally recognized that the ease- 
ment for public passage covers a t  least those lands within the 
lines of high water. 
In Trustees of Freeholders and Commonalty of the Town 
of Southampton u. Heilner, 84 Misc. 2d 318, 329, 375 
N.Y.S.2d 761, 771 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975), the court concluded 
that, because Shinnecock Bay was non-tidal when the riparian 
owners took title, they acquired ownership to the low water 
mark, but that such ownership was "subject to a right of the 
public for navigation and connected uses up to the present 
high-water mark." 
In Bacorn u. State, 20 Misc. 2d 369, 373-374, 195 
N.Y.S.2d 214, 219-20 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1959), the court rejected a 
claim of compensation for lands a t  the margin of the naviga- 
ble Chemung River. The state had appropriated the lands for 
use in a flood control project. Referring to the stream-side 
lands as part of the "bed", and therefore subject to the public 
right, the court said: "The fact that there was sometimes no 
water over this particular area does not establish that it does 
not constitute a part of the bed of the Chemung River." It 
concluded that "whether claimants . . . owned title under the 
bed of the stream is immaterial" because, title or no, the 
state's use of the lands would be "a proper exercise of the 
State's [sic] power over public waters" for which no compen- 
sation would be required. Id. 
In People ex rel. New York, 0. & W. Ry. v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 116 Misc. 774, 775, 191 N.Y.S. 464, 466 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1921) (Susquehanna River), the court spoke of "[tlhe ser- 
vitude of privately owned lands forming the banks and bed of 
a stream to the interest of navigation . . . ." (emphasis added). 
In Champlain & St. L. R.R. u. Valentine, 19 Barb. 484, 
492 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853), the court held that ownership 
bounded by Lake Champlain runs to the low water line, but if 
a building below the high water line "is an obstruction or an- 
noyance to the common passage by the public and to naviga- 
tion, it may be a public nuisance." 
But cf.: 
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People u. Waite, 103 Misc. 2d 204, 206, 425 N.Y.S.2d 462, 
463 (St. Law. County Ct. 1979). On the question of possible 
trespass by a boater who tied the boat to some brush, the 
court wrote that there was "insufficient evidence . . . as re- 
gards the location of the brush and whether it was growing 
from the bank of the river or situate within the stream." But 
the court added dicta suggesting that trespass might be possi- 
ble "if the boat is tied to the shore or anchored." Id.  at  207, 
425 N.Y.S.2d a t  464. No trespass was found on the facts 
before the court. 
Stewart u. Turney, 237 N.Y. 117, 130, 142 N.E. 437, 442 
(1923), in which the court demurred. After assuming that title 
on Cayuga Lake extends to the low water mark, the court 
wrote, "[wlhether in high water the public has not the right of 
navigation wherever a boat may float we do not decide." The 
court held that the defendants, who entered the beach area 
for the purpose of hunting, were trespassers. Id .  at  131, 142 
N.E. at  442. 
In its analysis, the court in Stewart v .  Turney, considered 
also what "bank" would mean when applied to a river. I t  
quoted with apparent approval from an Iowa case which de- 
fined the "high-water mark" of the Mississippi River, noting 
that a river bank means "the portion of earth which confines 
the river in its channel . . . . They are impressed upon the 
earth itself by the attrition of the river current. Certainly 
what the river does not occupy long enough to wrest from veg- 
etation is not river bed. All this is clearly true." Id .  at  127, 142 
N.E. a t  441. 
4.4. Recreational Use Under the Public Right of 
Passage - Although commercial usefulness is frequently 
given as both a rationale and a criterion for the public right of 
passage, no case found has ever held that the public's com- 
mon-law right of use is limited to commercial passage. On the 
contrary, the cases frequently describe the public's right of 
use in such generic terms as "travel", "passage", or "transpor- 
tation". See supra 5 4.2.1. Similarly, streams navigable in fact 
are typically referred to as ."highways" for public use, undist- 
inguished, except as to mode of transport, from public high- 
ways on dry land. See City of Albany v. State, 71 Misc. 2d 
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294, 296-98, 335 N.Y.S.2d 975, 978 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1972) (Inter- 
state Highway use is not a use "substantially different" from 
public waterway use). 
The notion that the public right is somehow inferentially 
limited to commercial use is contrary, moreover, to an express 
basic assumption which underlies the New York rule that al- 
lows private ownership of streams in the first place, uiz. that, 
irrespective of whether ownership is public or private, the law 
makes "no distinction against the public right of passage and 
transportation." Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. u. New 
York, 200 N.Y. 400, 412, 94 N.E.199, 202 (1911). Permitting 
bed-owners to prohibit recreational use would create a major 
practical difference between public and privately owned wa- 
terways - inasmuch as state owned waters are clearly availa- 
ble for recreational use. See Granger u. City of Canandaigua, 
257 N.Y. 126, 131, 177 N.E. 394, 396 (1931); Tucci u. 
Salzhauer, 40 A.D.2d 712, 713, 336 N.Y.S.2d 721, 723-24 (2d 
Dept. 1972), aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 854, 307 N.E.2d 256, 352 
N.Y.S.2d 198 (1973). This difference would also run counter to 
the postulate, made from the very first cases, that stream 
ownership can be private "without any public inconvenience." 
Palmer u. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 307, 319-20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) 
because "the rights and interests of the public, such as fish- 
ing, ferrying and transportation, are preserved . . . ." Smith u. 
City of Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 480 (1883) (emphasis added). 
There is no neat division between commercial and recrea- 
tional use. See e.g., Sawczyk u. United States Coast Guard, 
499 F. Supp. 1034, 1039 (W.D.N.Y. 1980), where the court 
found the Falls-to-Lewiston reach of the Niagara River to be 
navigable in fact [and thus subject to United States admiralty 
jurisdiction] based in part on commercial use in the form of 
regularly operated raft trips (apparently recreational), stating 
that "the raft venture a t  issue in these cases evidences the 
continuing effort to exploit the river commercially." 
Several cases provide clear affirmative indications that 
recreational use is included: 
In People u. Waite, 103 Misc. 2d 204, 425 N.Y.S.2d 462 
(St. Law. County Ct. 1979), a prosecution for trespass, the 
conviction was reversed on the grounds, merely, that the 
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stream in question was navigable, notwithstanding that the 
defendant's presence on the stream was apparently for a rec- 
reational purpose (non-commercial fishing). 
In Fairchild u. Kraemer, 11 A.D.2d 232, 235, 204 
N.Y.S.2d 823, 825 (2d Dept. 1960), an action by the bed- 
owner for trespass, the court stated that the "defendant's 
right to [use] . . . the basin depends upon whether . . . the 
creek was navigable . . . ." It also stated that: "The fact that a 
stream has been used for pleasure boating may be considered 
on the subject of the stream's capacity and the use of which it 
is susceptible." Id. at 235, 204 N.Y.S.2d a t  826. I t  appears 
from a companion case that the defendant's purpose was rec- 
reational. See People u. Kraemer, 7 Misc. 2d 373, 377, 164 
N.Y.S.2d 423, 427 (Police Ct. Suff. County 1957), aff'd, 6 
N.Y.2d 363, 160 N.E.2d 633, 189 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1959). 
In People ex rel. New York Cent. R.R. u. State Tax 
Comm'n, 258 A.D. 356, 360. 16 N.Y.S.2d 812, 817 (3d Dept. 
1940), aff'd, 284 N.Y. 616, 29 N.E.2d 932 (1940), the court, in 
holding certain waters to be navigable in fact, noted as a rele- 
vant factor "that the creek and bay had both been actually 
navigable commercially and for pleasure and that they still 
retain their capacity for use." (emphasis added). 
See Tucci u. Salzhauer, 40 A.D.2d 712, 713,336 N.Y.S.2d 
721, 723-24 (2d Dept. 1972), aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 854, 307 N.E.2d 
256, 352 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1973), which held that the jus pub- 
licum includes "use [of] the water covering the foreshore for 
boating, bathing, fishing and other lawful purposes; and when 
the tide is out . . . as a means of access to reach the water for 
the same purposes and to lounge and recline thereon," the lat- 
ter being "consistent with and necessary for the complete and 
innocent enjoyment of [the] right of access to the waters . . . 9 ,  
(emphasis. added). (It should be noted, however, that the 
lands thus subjected to the jus publicum were a tidal fore- 
shore still in government ownership. Cf. United States v. 
Kane, 602 F.2d 490,493 (2d Cir. 1979), observing that the jus 
publicum may be limited by a conveyance of the land into 
private ownership.) 
Cf.: 
Trustees of Freeholders and Commonalty of Southamp- 
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ton v. Heilner, 84 Misc. 2d 318, 328, 375 N.Y.S.2d 761, 770 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975), in which the court cited use by pleasure 
craft as the primary evidence of navigability in fact, stating, 
"[Iln today's life it cannot be said that this use is less impor- 
tant to society than commercial uses such as logging or trans- 
porting produce across the water." 
People u. System Properties, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 330, 344-45, 
141 N.E.2d 429, 435, 160 N.Y.S.2d 859, 867-68 (1957), in 
which the court referred to the reach of the state's power over 
Lake George held in trust for the people as being "as great as 
the uses and possibilities of the lake for navigation, as a wa- 
terpower reservoir and not excluding recreational uses." 
But cf.: 
Brant Lake Shores, Inc. v. Barton, 61 Misc. 2d 902, 907, 
307 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970), where title was 
the issue. The court wrote of Brant Lake: "As a public high- 
way, anyone could use i t  for generally accepted highway pur- 
poses over water, such as floating logs and timber, but this 
does not include the right to boat, bathe and swim." Despite 
the breadth of this dicta, the court apparently did not intend 
a statement of the general common law rule (for which no au- 
thorities were cited), but rather only an interpretation of the 
particular statute which it had before it. The statute in ques- 
tion had declared the lake and other waters to be "public 
highways for the purpose of floating logs, timber and lumber." 
Id. The court also noted that "however a public highway 
comes into existence, when once established there is no limita- 
tion of its use to certain individuals . . . ." Id. 
Granger u. City of Canandaigua, 257 N.Y. 126, 177 N.E. 
394 (1931), involved a dispute over lake bed title. The court 
said that to hold that the state "had dedicated the bed of 
[Canandaigua Lake] to private uses, subject to the rights of 
navigation only, would be not only to deprive the public of 
access to the water for recreation and enjoyment but also to 
deprive the riparian owners of their customary privileges." Id. 
at  131, 177 N.E. a t  396 (emphasis added). While this obiter 
dictum suggests that "navigation" might be something differ- 
ent from "recreation and enjoyment", recreational boating 
was not the topic of discussion a t  all. Rather, it was solely 
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non-boating recreational use of the disputed lands, "filling 
them for park purposes," that was at  issue in the case. Id. a t  
128, 177 N.E. at  395. The quoted language is, therefore, a t  
most a very weak and ambiguous authority for the proposition 
that recreational boating does not count as "navigation". 
Smi th  u. Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 483 (1883), in which the 
court said that "the sovereign right grew out of and was based 
upon the public benefits in promoting trade and commerce, 
supposed to be derived from keeping open navigable bodies of 
water as public highways for the common use of the people." 
(emphasis added). Although it added that the public naviga- 
tion easements would be "limited to the very purpose for 
which they were created," it made no suggestion that the 
easement was therefore limited to commercial travel as op- 
posed to non-commercial travel. Id. a t  484. More likely, the 
court meant only to support its holding in the case, uiz. the 
state cannot, under guise of the navigation easement, divert 
the waters from the navigable waterbody altogether, an action 
that is manifestly "inconsistent" with navigation for any  pur- 
pose whatsoever. Id.  at  484. 
4.5. Uses Incidental to Passage on Streams - 
Passage along a small stream frequently entails touching the 
bottom, sometimes requires touching or even going upon the 
banks, and may involve other activities, such as fishing. Apart 
from a few cases that approve anchoring, no New York cases 
have been found which explicitly deal with the legality of 
touching the bottom or shores, poling, lining, portaging or 
scouting in connection with lawful passage. Yet, from time im- 
memorial, these shore and bottom uses have presumably been 
unavoidable physical necessities for travel along smaller navi- 
gable rivers and streams. Apparently, no one has ever seen fit 
to challenge whether the public right of passage includes a 
right to make reasonable use of the bed and banks of a stream 
for purposes that are necessary incidents of passage itself. 
The right to make a t  least some minimal bottom and 
shore use in passage follows from the ordinary common law of 
easements. As the cases frequently state, the public right of 
passage is an easement. See supra 5 4.2.1. I t  is an easement of 
way which came into existence by implied reservation when 
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the state (or king) originally conveyed the servient riparian 
lands to their first private owners. Under the common law of 
easements, whenever "a right of way is reserved or granted, 
but not specifically defined, the rule is 'that the way need only 
be such as is reasonably necessary and convenient for the 
purpose for which it was created.' " Dalton u. Levy, 258 N.Y. 
161, 167, 179 N.E. 371, 372 (1932) (emphasis added). 
"Whatever is essential to the enjoyment of a thing granted 
must be taken by implication." Langdon u. City of New York, 
93 N.Y. 129, 147 (1883). 
The reason for this rule is common-sensical: "Without it 
the grant itself would be an absurdity and nullity." Id. a t  146. 
Quoting Coke on Littleton, the Court of Appeals added: "He 
who grants a thing, grants impliedly all that is necessary to 
the enjoyment of that thing, and this principle extends to 
grants made by the law." Id. a t  151 (emphasis added). While 
the public right of passage is an unusual easement in that it is 
held by the state in a sovereign capacity and in trust for the 
people, these are hardly reasons to cut it down. 
See also Tucci u. Salzhauer, 40 A.D.2d 712, 713, 336 
N.Y.S.2d 721, 723-24 (2d Dept. 1972), affd, 33 N.Y.2d 854, 
307 N.E.2d 256, 352 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1973) ("The right of access 
comprehends, 'necessarily and justly, whatever is needed for 
the complete and innocent enjoyment of that right.' " (quot- 
ing Trustees, Town of Brookhaven u. Smith, 188 N.Y. 74, 87, 
80 N.E. 665, 670 (1907)). 
4.5.1. Touching the Bottom - Several cases recognize 
a public right to touch the bottom (or shore within the high 
water lines) in connection with the public right of passage. 
Two dicta indicate limitations, uiz. that the touching must be 
within the banks of the stream and must be in connection 
with navigational use. 
4.5.1.1. Recognizing the Right - In Fairchild v. 
Kraemer, 11 A.D.2d 232, 235, 204 N.Y.S.2d 823, 825-26 (2d 
Dept. 1960), the court wrote of the right to "navigate and 
anchor" a boat as depending upon whether the waterbody was 
"navigable in fact", without in any way distinguishing be- 
tween the two, even though anchoring would have probably 
required the defendant to touch the bottom. 
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In People v. Kraemer, 164 N.Y.S.2d 423, 433 (Police Ct. 
Suff. County 1957), aff'd, 6 N.Y.2d 363, 160 N.E. 633, 189 
N.Y.S.2d 878 (1959) the court upheld a boater's right to 
anchor on privately owned submerged lands, quoting with ap- 
proval from Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. 
Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 87 (1913), as follows: "[Tlhe public right 
of navigation . . . must include the right to use the bed of the 
water for every purpose which is in aid of navigation." 
In Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 397 (1926), 
the Court indicated that privately owned lands under naviga- 
ble waters (the Hudson River off Manhattan) were subject, 
until filled, to navigation and "incident to such use, occasional 
mooring may . . . take place." This statement clearly appears 
to recognize that touching the bottom or shoreline are legiti- 
mate when incidental to lawful navigation over private under- 
water lands. 
I t  should be noted, analogously, that the foreshore of 
tidal waters is subject to "touching" in connection with the 
public right of passage - on foot when the tide is out - even 
if the lands in question are held in private ownership. Barnes 
u. Midland R.R. Terminal Co., 193 N.Y. 378, 386 (1908), mod- 
ified in part, 218 N.Y. 91 (1916) (upholding right of public to 
pass under and over a pier on private lands between the high 
and low water lines). 
See also People u. Johnson, 7 Misc. 2d 385, 387, 166 
N.Y.S.2d 732, 734 (Police Ct. Suff. County 1957) ("anchoring 
in the lands was [described] as an incident to the exercise of 
the public's dominant right of navigation."). 
4.5.1.2. Appearing to Limit the Right - In People 
v. Waite, 103 Misc. 2d 204, 206, 425 N.Y.S.2d 462, 463 (St. 
Law. County Ct. 1979), a prosecution for trespass, the defend- 
ant had tied a line from his boat to some brush along the 
shore, but the court overturned the conviction without regard 
to the question of whether such conduct, in itself, constituted 
a trespass, noting: "[Tlhere was insufficient evidence . . . as 
regards the location of the brush and whether it was growing 
from the bank of the river or situate within the stream." The 
court indicated, however, that "a trespass infraction may be 
found if the boat is tied to the shore or anchored." Id. at  207, 
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425 N.Y.S.2d a t  464. (emphasis added). 
In Stewart u. Turney, 237 N.Y. 117, 130, 142 N.E. 437, 
442 (1923), the Court of Appeals held that certain unnamed 
activities on a privately owned lakeshore, i.e., above the low 
water mark of Cayuga Lake, constituted trespass. From the 
Appellate Division report, the activities a t  issue seem to have 
been limited to hunting. See Stewart u. Turney, 203 A.D. 486, 
197 N.Y.S. 81 (4th Dept. 1922). There was no indication that 
the activities in question were in any way related to naviga- 
tion, and hunting per se is not an activity traditionally said to 
be encompassed within the New York public right of passage 
on fresh waters. 
4.5.2. Carrying or Portaging Around Obstacles - 
Because the public right of passage is an easement, see supra 
$ 5  4.2.1. and 4.5, the width of the right of way should be 
whatever is "necessary for the use for which it was created." 
Town of Ulster u. Massa, 144 A.D.2d 726, 728, 535 N.Y.S.2d 
460, 461 (3d Dept. 1988). See also Dalton v. Leuy, 258 N.Y. 
161,167 (1932); Langdon u. Mayor, 93 N.Y. 129, 145-47 (1883) 
("Whatever is essential to the enjoyment of the thing granted 
must be taken by implication."). 
Numerous cases uphold the principle that a stream may 
be navigable in fact and, thus, subject to the public right of 
passage, even though the stream has places where there are 
rifts, shallows or other obstacles. See supra 5 2.3.4 None of 
these cases states what boaters are expected (or permitted) to 
do when they encounter such obstacles to navigation. Yet the 
public right of passage would have little practical significance 
on these streams if it did not include the incidental right to 
survey and make necessary detours around the obstacles. The 
application of the ordinary common law of easements to these 
situations seems too obvious to have been litigated. 
Above the banks there is "no highway along the margin of 
our navigable rivers and lakes." Ledyard u. Ten Eyck, 36 
Barb. 102, 127 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1862) (Cazenovia Lake). No 
case, however, has ever questioned the public's right to make 
the minimal shore uses which, due to topography, are insepa- 
rable incidents of passage itself, e.g., portaging, lining and 
scouting rapids. 
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In People v. Kraemer, 164 N.Y.S.2d 423, 433 (Police Ct. 
Suff. County 1957), the court recognized a right to go ashore 
when necessary in connection with navigation even though it 
found the particular defendant guilty of trespass in going 
upon the foreshore of navigable tidal waters, stating: "[Tlhe 
public right of navigation does not include the right to enter 
upon the foreshore when it is in private ownership, except 
when and to the extent necessary in the exercise of the right 
of navigation. The ,defendant . . . does not contend that an 
emergency arose . . . that required him to go ashore." (empha- 
sis added). 
Further support for a right to go ashore when necessary 
in connection with navigation is to be found in the larger con- 
text of common law. The right of members of the public to  
deviate from blocked public ways and go onto privately owned 
land is long established. See 1 HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY, 
TORTS 49 (2d ed. 1986); PROSSER AND KEETON, TORTS 145-148 
(5th ed. 1984). The principle was recognized in New York over 
a century ago, and it has never been denied: "A person travel- 
ling on a public highway, and finding a place foundrious and 
impassible, has doubtless a right to remove enough of the 
fences in the adjoining close to enable him to pass around the 
obstruction." Williams v. Safford, 7 Barb. 309, 314 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1849). This principle is, moreover, a part of the general 
American common law, as evidenced by the following in the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 195 (1965): 
A traveler on a public highway who reasonably believes 
that such highway is impassable, is privileged, when he 
reasonably believes it to be necessary in order to continue 
his journey, to enter, to a reasonable extent and in a rea- 
sonable manner, upon neighboring land in the possession 
of another . . . . 
See also citations dating from the year 1679 and after in the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 3 195 (1965). 
Even more directly on point, the Restatement describes 
the right to navigate upon navigable waters as including "the 
ancillary privilege to enter on riparian land to the extent that 
Heinonline - -  6 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 5 2 9  1 9 8 8 - 1 9 8 9  
530 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6 
this is necessary for the accomplishment of the (purpose of 
the) principal privilege." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS $ 
193, Comment d (1965). This privilege is really only a particu- 
lar application of the general common law rule already noted 
above for defining the extent of rights of way which are not 
specifically defined, viz. the way will be such as is "reasonably 
necessary and convenient for the purpose for which it was 
created." Dalton v. Levy, 258 N.Y. 161, 167 (1932). See supra 
g 4.5. 
In summary, despite the paucity of direct judicial confir- 
mation, all of the pointers in the case law indicate that the 
public right of passage includes a right to use riparian lands 
insofar as is reasonably necessary to accomplish safe passage 
itself. I t  is not the policy of the common law to withhold that 
which would be "essential to the enjoyment of a thing 
granted" and without which "the grant itself would be an ab- 
surdity and nullity." Langdon u. Mayor, 93 N.Y. 129, 145-46 
(1883). An implicit right to make some minimal shore use is 
essential in order for the many cases which define rivers with 
obstacles as "navigable in fact" to make any sense. 
4.5.3. Fishing - According to Lord Hale, the English 
law gave riparian owners on freshwater streams "the propriety 
of the soil, and consequently, the right of fishing usque ad fi- 
lum aquae . . . ." (emphasis added). See Hargrave's Hale, De 
Jure Maris a t  ch. 1, quoted in People u. Platt, 17 Johns. Rep. 
195, 209 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819). In the first New York case in- 
volving a navigable freshwater stream, the court followed the 
English precedent and held that the exclusive right of fishery 
belongs to the owner of the streambed. Hooker v. Cummings, 
20 Johns. 90, 100-01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822). More recent cases, 
however, have recognized that freshwater streams subject to 
the public right of passage are also subject to a public right to 
fish, a t  least from a boat. 
As also noted earlier, the Court of Appeals has, a t  one 
point, strongly suggested that Lord Hale misconceived the 
English law of fresh water ownership entirely, See supra $ 3. 
Ownership of Streambeds. While the Court of Appeals even- 
tually reconfirmed New York's general adherence to the Hale 
version of things, putting the beds of fresh water in private 
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ownership, it did so on the assumption that the public rights 
of "fishing, ferrying and transportation" were preserved. See 
infra discussion of Hooker u. Cummings. 
In People u. Waite, 103 Misc. 2d 204, 425 N.Y.S.2d 462 
(St. Law. County Ct. 1979), a prosecution for trespass, the de- 
fendant was accused of fishing in a posted stream (the St. Re- 
gis River) from a boat. The locus in quo was within an area 
that had been leased for exclusive fishing and hunting to a 
private club. The court wrote: 
[A]s the West Bank of the St. Regis River is by the trial 
evidence shown to afford a channel for useful commerce 
of a substantial and permanent character, and the stream 
is not privately owned, neither . . . [riparian]. . . can be 
found to own the water flowing in front of the premises. A 
person boating on the waters is, therefore, not a tres- 
passer, even if he utilizes the stream for fishing . . . . 
Id. at  207, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 464. 
In People u. Johnson, 7 Misc. 2d 385, 388, 166 N.Y.S.2d 
732, 735 (Police Ct. Suff. County 1957), the court wrote: "At 
common law, the public ordinarily had the right to hunt and 
fish in waters subject to the public right of navigation." The 
court cited Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Shultz, 116 N.Y. 382, 387 
(1889) which stated that: "The right to navigate the public 
waters and to fish therein are public rights belonging to the 
People at  large." The court also cited Slingerland u. Interna- 
tional Contr. Co., 169 N.Y. 60, 72 (1901), which held that 
" [flishing in navigable rivers, . . . is presumptively common to 
the public . . . ." Insofar as these cases expressed views con- 
cerning non-tidal waters, it should be noted that all three pro- 
vide only dictum. They are, however, consistent with the ap- 
parent intent of the Court of Appeals to preserve public 
fishing when, in Smith v. City of Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 481 
(1883) it confined the "navigable in fact" criterion of state 
ownership (American rule) to the Hudson and the Mohawk 
Rivers. See infra. 
In Smith u. City of Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 480 (1883), 
the court recognized a public right of fishing as the co-equal 
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of transportation, asserting: "[Tlhe rights and interests of the 
public, such as fishing, ferrying and transportation, are pre- 
served in all navigable waters by the inherent and inalienable 
9 9  attributes of the sovereign . . . . 
In Gould u. James, 6 Cow. 369, 376 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826), 
there was dictum quoting the English private-fishery rule as 
the law "of this state". 
In Ex parte Jennings, 6 Cow. 518, 527 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1826), the rule was recognized, in dictum, that "the owners of 
land on the margin, above tide water, have been allowed the 
several and exclusive right of fishery." 
In Hooker u. Cummings, 20 Johns. 90, 100-01 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1822), it was held to be a trespass to fish in the Salmon 
River (near Lake Ontario) even though the stream was navi- 
gable in fact. The court stated that it was following the Eng- 
lish rule that, above the ebb and flow of the tides, "the adjoin- 
ing owners have the exclusive right" - including the exclusive 
right of fishery. [This case was severely criticized in People ex 
rel. Loomis u. Canal Appraisers, 33 N.Y. 461, 474-77 (1865), 
the case which adopted the American majority rule - albeit 
temporarily - as the law of New York (i.e., navigability in 
fact is navigability in law)]. See supra Chapter 111. Although 
the Loomis adoption of the American majority rule for defin- 
ing "navigable" was later repudiated by Smith u. City of 
Rochester, quoted above, the part of Loomis that concedes a 
public right of fishing on all streams navigable in fact (see 
above quote) apparently survived. 
Cf.: 
Hill u. Bishop, 63 Hun. 624,17 N.Y.S. 297,298 (5th Dept. 
1892) (dictum appearing to recognize the English rule that the 
exclusive right of fishery is owned by the bed owner of a 
pond). 
People u. Platt, 17 Johns. 195, 216 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819): 
"[Tlhe river Saranac is not capable of being used as a pas- 
sageway for boats, or water craft of any kind . . . The fishery 
itself has passed under the grants . . . . 9 9 
4.5.4. Limitations on the Public Right of Passage 
- The courts in New York have seldom had occasion to ad- 
dress what limitation might apply to the public's right of 
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passage. 
In Smith u. Odell, 234 N.Y. 267, 271-72,137 N.E. 325, 326 
(1922), the court upheld exclusive hunting leases for Great 
South Bay made by the Town of Brookhaven. The court 
found that the town is the owner of the bed of the bay under 
colonial patents which expressly gave Brookhaven the exclu- 
sive rights of "fishing, hawking, hunting and fowling." In the 
view of the Appellate Division, the right of passage inciden- 
tally included a right to take wild fowl. Smith u. Odell, 194 
A.D. 763,766, 185 N.Y.S. 647,649 (2d Dept. 1921). The Court 
of Appeals disagreed, in this particular case, because of the 
colonial patent. The latter court stated: "The public right, 
whatever it might otherwise be, must be held limited in such a 
situation to the right to use the waters for the purposes of a 
public highway." Smith u. Odell, 234 N.Y. at 272, 137 N.E. a t  
327. The court added that "the easement of passage over nav- 
igable water does not involve a surrender of other privileges 
which are capable of enjoyment without interference with the 
navigator." Id. 
In People ex rel. New York, 0. & W. Ry. u. State Tax 
Comm'n, 116 Misc. 774, 775, 191 N.Y.S. 464, 466 (Sup. Ct. 
1921) (Susquehanna River), the court observed, as dictum: 
"The easement . . . gives to the public the right to use the 
stream for the purposes of navigation only." 
In Ex Parte Jennings, 6 Cow. 518, 527, 528 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1826), it was said: "The public right is one of passage, and 
nothing more; as in a common highway. It is called by the 
cases an easement; and the proprietor of the adjoining land 
has a right to use the land and water of the river in any way 
not inconsistent with this easement." Quoted in Smith u. 
Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 485 (1883) (emphasis added). 
4.6. Conveyances of Underwater Land Free of 
Public Navigation Rights - The settled rule is that the 
state legislature has, within certain limits, the power to con- 
vey land under navigable waters without preserving the public 
right of passage. The limitations on this legislative power to 
abridge or extinguish the public right are, speaking generally, 
requirements of public interest, but the limitations have not 
been defined by the courts with any specificity. 
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For the most part, in cases where extinguishment of the 
jus publicum has been judicially approved, the underwater ar- 
eas affected were typically at the water margins and relatively 
small compared with the waterway as a whole. The New York 
courts have consistently struck down wholesale divestitures to 
private interests of massive areas under water, and they have 
never allowed the public right of passage to be extinguished to 
such an extent as to render whole stretches of navigable water 
non-navigable. 
It should be noted that most of the cases which consider 
these questions involve express grants of lands under tidal 
waters. The cases make no suggestion, however, that the state 
has any less power to grant lands free of the public's naviga- 
tion rights in fresh waters - nor that its power in respect to 
fresh waters is subject to less stringent limitations. The fol- 
lowing differences should, however, be noted: 
I. In the case of tidal waters, a "special effort" must be 
made for the state to convey any title whatsoever to un- 
derwater lands. Without an explicit intention to the con- 
trary, grants of shorelands held by the sovereign are pre- 
sumed not to include any interest in lands below the high 
water line. See Tiffany u. Town of Oyster Bay, 209 N.Y. 
1, 9, 102 N.E. 585, 587 (1913); Sage u. Mayor, 154 N.Y. 
61, 69-70, 47 N.E. 1096, 1097-98 (1897). On the other 
hand, if it is found that the state did make a valid uncon- 
ditional grant of lands under tidal waters - especially if 
for a consideration - the applicable rule permits the 
public's right of passage to be impaired by the grant "so 
as to make [the grant] effectual for some purpose." Lang- 
don u. New York, 93 N.Y. 129, 144 (1883). See also Peo- 
ple u. Steeplechase Park Co., 218 N.Y. 459, 469, 113 N.E. 
521, 523 (1916) ("If it had been [the] intention to reserve 
to the public a right of passage over the lands included in 
the grant, they would have provided therefor . . . ."). 
2. In the case of fresh waters, no "special effort" need be 
made for the state to convey private title to underwater 
lands. On the contrary, any grant of lands adjacent to a 
non-tidal stream is presumed to carry title to the center 
of the stream, subject to the public's right of passage. See 
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supra $5 3.2 and 3.4. While the ownership of lands under 
fresh waters thus passes easily - indeed, by implication 
-from the sovereign to private hands, there has never 
been the corresponding tendency to presume that the pri- 
vate titles in fresh waters are intended to be free of the 
public's right of passage. See Shaw u. Crawford, 10 Johns. 
236, 238 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) ("Individuals who occupy 
the adjoining banks may use the waters for their own 
emolument, so far only as it can be done without any ma- 
terial interruption of the public use."). 
4.6.1. State Has Power to Convey Free of Public 
Navigation Rights - Many cases, including virtually all of 
the more recent cases, hold, or a t  least recognize, that the 
state has the power to convey underwater lands free of public 
navigation rights. 
In United States u. Kane, 602 F.2d 490, 493 (2d Cir. 
1979), the court recognized the possibility that a private 
owner might have a right to fence off the foreshore (on tidal 
waters), stating that "it is not a t  all clear that free access 
along the foreshore has been held to be a public right in New 
York when the state . . . has conveyed the right to a portion of 
the foreshore to a private party." Because of such possibility, 
the court reversed a grant of summary judgment to remove 
the fences. 
In Riviera Ass'n, Inc. u. North Hempstead, 52 Misc. 2d 
575, 582, 276 N.Y.S.2d 249, 256-57 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967), the 
court summarized the cases as follows: "[Wlhile conveyance of 
lands under water for a public purpose is permissible because 
it accords with the public trust, purpose is not the determina- 
tive factor [citations omitted]. Rather the validity of the con- 
veyance turns on the degree to which the public interest will 
be impaired . . . ." At another point it noted that: "Such limi- 
tation upon alienation of land under water as there is exists to 
protect the public right of navigation and other lawful uses of 
the water." [Citations omitted] Id. a t  579, 276 N.Y.S.2d a t  
253. (Upheld a conveyance by town of filled tidal lands where 
navigation was "in no way adversely affected by the fill . . . . 9 ,  
Id. at  579, 276 N.Y.S.2d a t  254). 
In People u. New York & Ontario Power Co., 219 A.D. 
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114, 115-117, 219 N.Y.S. 497, 500 (3d Dept. 1927), the court 
wrote that the legislature may "grant unconditional rights in 
shore waters or in streams, [citations omitted] if such right 
. . . will not unreasonably interfere with the general use and 
control of the public waters." (citations omitted). 
In Appleby u. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 383-84 
(1926), the United States Supreme Court considered the effect 
of a conveyance of certain underwater lands on the west side 
of Manhattan. The Court concluded, after an extensive re- 
view, that: 
[Wlhenever the legislature deemed it  to be in the public 
interest to grant a deed in fee simple to land under tidal 
waters and exclude itself from i ts  exercise as sovereign of  
the  jus publicum, that is the power to preserve and regu- 
late navigation, it might do so; but tha t  conclusion that  it 
had excluded the  jus publicum could only be reached 
upon clear evidence of its intention and of the  public in- 
terest i n  promotion of  which it acted. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The court affirmed that the state may "by an absolute 
deed of land under water, with the right of the grantee to fill 
it, part with its own power to regulate the navigation of water 
over this land which would interfere with its ownership and 
enjoyment by the grantee." Id. a t  388-89. 
In its opinion in Appleby, the New York Court of Ap- 
peals had declared: "It scarcely needs assertion that [the gov- 
ernment] could not destroy the navigability of the Hudson by 
making exclusive private grants." Appleby u. City of New 
York, 235 N.Y. 351, 361, 139 N.E. 474, 475 (1923). The Court 
of Appeals had upheld the city's right to dredge Appleby's 
land on the grounds that Appleby's ownership was, in any 
event, subject to the federal navigation easement. The United 
States Supreme Court held that the federal navigation ease- 
ment did not, however, somehow preserve that the rights of 
the city once it had conveyed the jus publicum to Appleby's 
predecessor. 271 U.S. a t  399-402. Accord Waterford Elec. 
Light, Heat & Power Co. u. State, 208 A.D. 273, 287, 203 
N.Y.S. 858, 871 (3d Dept. 1924), aff'd, 239 N.Y. 629, 147 N.E. 
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225 (1925) (The "State [sic], as between itself and the claim- 
ant, cannot be heard to raise the bar of the Federal act to 
avoid payment of compensation . . . ."). 
In James Frazee Milling Co. u. State, 122 Misc. 545, 549, 
204 N.Y.S. 645, 649 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1924) (Seneca River), the 
court wrote: 
I t  is well established in this country that the Legislature 
of the state may, as the representative of the people, 
grant the soil or confer an exclusive privilege in navigable 
rivers or waters held by it for the people, or authorize a 
use inconsistent with the public right, or interfere with 
the right of navigation, (emphasis added) so far as the 
public is concerned, when acting in the public interest." 
(emphasis in original). 
In First Construction Co. v. New York, 221 N.Y. 295, 316, 
116 N.E. 1020, 1026 (1917) (Gowanus Bay), an action for just 
compensation for an alleged taking of lands under tidal waters 
the court wrote: "[Aln act granting the right to fill in lands 
under water, and thereby acquire title to the same, gives an 
inchoate, vested interest in the lands described which is a 
property right . . . . 9 ,  
In People u. Steeplechase Park Co., 218 N.Y. 459, 113 
N.E. 521 (1916), the court upheld the right of a private owner 
of Atlantic Ocean foreshore lands to obstruct the public's 
right of passage, observing that the owner had received "an 
unrestricted fee", Id. a t  469, 113 N.E. at  523, and that since 
1786, "thousands of grants have been made, some with, and 
some without restrictions, some absolute, and some condi- 
tional. Upon the faith of the title of lands so conveyed in fee 
there are now docks, wharves, and buildings . . . lands filled 
in, built upon and beneficially enjoyed worth millions of dol- 
lars." Id. at  471, 113 N.E. a t  524. "If it had been [the govern- 
ment officers'] intention to reserve to the public a right of 
passage over the lands included in the grant, they would have 
provided therefor . . . ." Id. at  469,113 N.E. a t  523. "[A] grant 
for 'beneficial enjoyment' to a grantee, his heirs and assigns, 
imports a fee . . . ." Id. at  472, 113 N.E. 524. 
In People v. D. & H. Co., 213 N.Y. 194, 199, 107 N.E. 506, 
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507 (1914), the court wrote: "The state, except for [federal 
constitutional] limitations, has power to grant the title to 
lands under water, unconditionally or conditionally, or it may 
grant special rights therein, or it may restrict the boundaries 
of  navigable waters by defining the same." (emphasis added). 
In Long Sault Dev. Co. u. Kennedy, 212 N.Y. 1, 8, 105 
N.E. 849 (1914), the court wrote: "The power of the legisla- 
ture to grant land under navigable waters to private persons 
or corporations for beneficial enjoyment has been exercised 
too long and has been affirmed by this court too often to be 
open to serious question . . . ." Id. at  8, 105 N.E. a t  851. The 
court nevertheless held the attempted grant invalid noting 
that "[ilt virtually turns over to the corporation entire control 
of navigation at  the Long Sault Rapids." on the St. Lawrence 
River. Id. at 9, 105 N.E. at  852 (emphasis added). 
In People v .  New York & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 
N.Y. 71, 78 (1877), the court stated that "the legislature may, 
as the representative of the people, grant the soil, or confer an 
exclusive privilege in tidewaters, or authorize a use inconsis- 
tent with the public right . . . ." (emphasis added). 
In Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9, 20-21 (N.Y. 1829), the 
chancellor observed the following distinction: 
[tlhe king as parens patriae owned the soil under all the 
waters of all navigable [i.e.,  tidal] rivers . . . for the bene- 
fit of his subjects a t  large; who were entitled to the free 
use of the sea, and all tide water, for the purposes of navi- 
gation, fishing, &c., . . . The king can not now deprive his 
subjects of their rights, by granting the public navigable 
waters to individuals. But there can be no doubt of the 
right of parliament in England, or the legislature of this 
state, to make such grants, to make such grants, when 
they do not interfere with the vested rights of particular 
individuals. 
(emphasis added). Quoted with approval in Gould v. Hudson 
River R.R., 6 N.Y. 522, 539 (1852). 
Other cases recognizing the state's power to grants rights 
which may impair or destroy public right of passage follow: 
"The policy of the State, since an early time in the his- 
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tory of our State, has been directed toward encouraging the 
private development of waterfronts, subject only to the condi- 
tion that the use be reasonable and not obstructive of naviga- 
tion [Citation omitted]." Town of Hempstead u. Oceanside 
Yacht Harbor Inc., 38 A.D.2d 263, 266, 328 N.Y.S.2d 894, 898 
(2d Dept. 1972), aff'd, 32 N.Y.2d 859, 299 N.E.2d 895, 346 
N.Y.S.2d 529 (1973). 
People u. New York & Ontario Power Co., 219 A.D. 114, 
116, 219 N.Y.S. 497, 501 (3d Dept. 1927): The legislature may 
"for the advantage of the public . . . grant unconditional rights 
in shore waters or in streams [Citation omitted] if such right 
. . . will not unreasonably interfere with the general use and 
control of the pubic waters." 
Barnes u. Midland R.R. Terminal Co., 193 N.Y. 378, 386 
(1908), modified in part, 218 N.Y. 91 (1916) (Pier between 
high and low water lines on tidal waters could obstruct public 
passage only to the extent necessary to permit reasonable use 
of the upland.). 
Ledyard u. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb. 102, 126 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1862) (Cazenovia Lake: When "[tlhe defendant entered into 
possession [by lawfully filling] the shallow water in front of 
and next to his property . . . the trusteeship of the state . . . 
. was virtually at  an end."). 
See also: 
Bay Ridge Dock Co. Inc. u. United Dry Docks Inc., 146 
Misc. 404, 262 N.Y.S. 212 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 237 A.D. 
900, 261 N.Y.S. 1002 (2d Dept. 1933). 
In Saunders u. New York Central and Hudson River 
R.R., 144 N.Y. 75, 86, 38 N.E. 992, 994 (1894), the court 
stated: "While the state holds title to lands under navigable 
waters in a certain sense as a trustee for the public, it is com- 
petent for the supreme legislative power to authorize and reg- 
ulate grants of the same for public, or such other purposes as 
it may determine to be for the best interests of the state . . . . 9 ,  
Other Cases: 
In Riviera Ass'n, Inc. u. N. Hempstead, 52 Misc. 2d 575, 
579, 276 N.Y.S.2d 249,253 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967), the court in- 
dicated that lawfully filled underwater land loses its character 
. . . . . , . . . , 
as "navigable"; but cf. Romart Properties, Inc. u. City of New 
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Rochelle, 67 Misc. 2d 162, 171, 324 N.Y.S.2d 277, 286 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1971), aff'd, 40 A.D.2d 987, 338 N.Y.S.2d 247 (2d 
Dept. 1972) (one who fills does not acquire riparian rights of 
"upland owner"). 
In I n  re City of New York, 295 N.Y. 415, 429, 68 N.E.2d 
422, 427-28 (1946), the court wrote: "[Tlhe rule that 'land 
originally under water is treated as land under water even af- 
ter it is filled' is not an inflexible one . . . [Lland under water 
may lose its 'character of foreshore' a t  least for some purposes 
. . . where the filling is pursuant to permission or grant." 
In Tiffany u. Town of Oyster Bay, 234 N.Y. 15, 20, 136 
N.E. 224, 225 (1922), the court wrote: "When the sovereign 
grants to the owner of the adjacent upland the title to lands 
under navigable waters, such owner may . . . fill in such lands, 
make upland out of them, and extinguish the jus publicum. 
(citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
Roe u. Strong, 107 N.Y. 350, 358, 14 N.E. 294, 296 (1887) 
("The title to the soil under navigable waters vested in the 
Long Island towns under the colonial patents was, undoubt- 
edly, subject to the public right of navigation, and i t  would 
seem to follow that the towns could not alienate the title so 
acquired to the material prejudice of the common right." 
(emphasis added)). 
Williams u. Mayor of New York, 105 N.Y. 419, 428, 11 
N.E. 829, 830 (1887) ("This right was tantamount to an own- 
ership. It embraced the entire beneficial interest, and was in- 
consistent with any title remaining in the State. . . . All use 
for the floating of vessels disappeared, so far as it [the wharf] 
occupied the water."). 
Mayor of New York u. Law, 125 N.Y. 380, 26 N.E. 471 
(1891). 
4.6.2. State Has No Power to Convey Free of 
Navigation Easement - A few cases contain dicta to the 
apparent effect that the state does not have the power to con- 
vey underwater lands free of public navigation rights. 
"[Alnyone who secured a grant or patent from the State 
Government of lands under waters took the same subject to 
the right of navigation, travel along the foreshore, fishing and 
bathing . . . [This] has been sometimes referred to as the "jus 
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publicum". Town of Smithtown v. Poueromo, 71 Misc. 2d 524, 
531, 336 N.Y.S.2d 764, 773-74 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972), rev'd on 
other grounds, 79 Misc. 2d 42, 359 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1973) (Nis- 
sequogue River). 
In People ex rel. New York, 0. & W. Ry. v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 116 Misc. 774, 775, 191 N.Y.S. 464, 466 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1921) (Susquehanna River), the court observed, as dictum: 
"The easement pertains to the sovereignty of the state [and] 
is inalienable . . . . 9 ,  
In Smith v. Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 477 (1883), the court 
wrote: "Among other rights which pertain to sovereignty is 
that of using, regulating and controlling for special purposes 
the waters of all navigable lakes or streams, whether fresh or 
salt, and without regard to the ownership of the soil beneath 
the water. This right is known as the jus publici and is 
deemed to be inalienable." (emphasis added). The court may, 
however, have been confusing the state's general legislative 
power (police power), which is, of course, inalienable with the 
public navigation easement, sometimes known as the "jus 
publicum" . 
Miller v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.2d 34, 35, 203 N.E.2d 
478, 480, 255 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1964) (property impressed with a 
trust for the public cannot be alienated without express legis- 
lative sanction). See also Brooklyn Park Comm'n v. Arm- 
strong, 45 N.Y. 234 (1871). 
4.6.3. Effect of Conveyance Free of Public Navi- 
gation Right - In Appleby u. City of New York, 271 U.S. 
364, 397 (1926), in holding that a conveyance, with right to 
fill, of underwater lands would convey the jus publicum, the 
Court observed: 
Of course we do not intend to say that, under such deeds 
as these, as long as water connected with the river re- 
mains over the land conveyed and to be filled, navigation 
may not go on and boats may not ply over it, and that 
incident to such use occasional mooring may not take 
place. 
Nevertheless, "[als the city has parted with the jus pub- 
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licum in respect to these lots, it . . . must be content with 
sailing over it with boats as it finds it." Id. a t  400. 
Once the jus publicum has been conveyed, "the city [or 
state] can be revested with [that] only by a condemnation of 
the rights granted." Id. at  399. Any effort to regulate or im- 
prove navigation in the meantime, as by dredging the under- 
water lots conveyed, "is a trespass upon the plaintiffs [private 
owner's] rights." Id. a t  400. In summary, while the public may 
still ply the waters over lands conveyed for use inconsistent 
with navigation, so long as they are wet, eminent domain 
would be required to re-establish the state's power to promote 
and preserve public right to navigate. 
In First Construction Co. u. New York, 221 N.Y. 295, 316, 
116 N.E. 1020, 1026 (1917) (Gowanus Bay), an action for just 
compensation for an alleged taking of lands under tidal wa- 
ters, the court wrote: "an act granting the right to fill in lands 
under water, and thereby acquire title to the same, gives and 
inchoate, vested interest in the lands described which is a 
property right and . . . the grantee cannot be deprived without 
compensation." 
See also: Bay Ridge Dock Co. u. United Dry Docks, 146 
Misc. 404, 262 N.Y.S. 212 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 237 A.D. 
900, 261 N.Y.S. 1002 (2d Dept. 1933). 
4.6.4. Limitations on the State's Power to Convey 
Free of Public Navigation Right - While many New 
York cases approve an extinguishment of the public right of 
passage, in none of these cases did the state attempt to convey 
the entire channel or navigational right-of-way so as to totally 
close a navigable waterway for its entire breadth over a sub- 
stantial length. The case of Illinois Cent. R. Co. u. Illinois, 
146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892), is the landmark "public trust" case 
standing for the proposition that such an extravagant convey- 
ance of the public right would be invalid. In considering a 
purported conveyance by Illinois of 1000 acres under Lake 
Michigan - the entire Chicago harbor plus some - the 
United States Supreme Court said: 
I t  is grants of parcels under navigable waters . . . for 
structures . . . in aid of commerce, and grants of parcels 
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which, being occupied, do not substantially impair the 
public interest in the lands and waters remaining, that 
are chiefly considered and sustained in the adjudged cases 
as a valid exercise of legislative power consistently with 
the [public] trust. . . . It is only by observing the distinc- 
tion between a grant of such parcels for the improue- 
ment of the public interest or which when occupied do 
not substantially impair the  public interest i n  the lands 
and waters remaining, and a grant of the whole property 
in  which the public is interestedj that the language of 
the adjudged cases can be reconciled. 
Id. at  453 (emphasis added). 
Although the quoted portion of the Illinois Central case is, 
strictly speaking, a statement of Illinois law, it was cited with 
approval and followed in Long Sau l t  Deu. Co. u. Kennedy ,  212 
N.Y. 1, 10 (1914), and Coxe u. S ta t e ,  144 N.Y. 396, 39 N.E. 
400 (1895). 
In Coxe u. S ta te ,  144 N.Y. 396, 405 (1895), the Court of 
Appeals acknowledged "the power of the sovereign to alienate 
lands under tide waters," but it noted that: 
the courts have never yet attempted to fix the precise lim- 
its of the legislative power . . . . I t  is very difficult and 
perhaps wholly impracticable to do so. It would, no 
doubt, be difficult to reconcile all the numerous expres- 
sions of opinion to be found in the decisions on this ques- 
tion. In many of them general language is used which 
would seem to sanction the doctrine of absolute owner- 
ship and the unrestrained power of disposition by the 
sovereign, but .  . . [when] read and understood with refer- 
ence to the special facts of each case, . . . much of the 
apparent conflict disappears. 
Id. at  406. 
The court in Coxe concluded with the following general 
principles: "The title which the state holds [in lands under 
navigable waters] . . . cannot be surrendered, alienated or del- 
egated, except for some public purpose, or some reasonable 
use which can fairly be said t o  be for the  public benefit." Id. 
a t  406. (emphasis added). As examples, it listed: (a) a grant to 
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a municipality, (b) grants to railroads, (c) grants to persons 
engaged in commerce or navigation, and (d) grants to adjoin- 
ing upland owners for beneficial enjoyment or commercial 
purposes, but not (e) grants "for mere speculative purposes". 
Id. at  407. 
4.6.4.1. Limitation: No Substantial Interference 
with Navigation - In Moyer u. State, 56 Misc. 2d 549, 
551, 289 N.Y.S.2d 114, 116 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1968), the court up- 
held the right of a riparian owner to build out into a bay of 
Lake Ontario, but stated as a limitation: "[Alny use made of 
the riparian rights must be such that it does not interfere with 
navigation . . . . 9 9  
In New York Power & Light Corp. u. State, 230 A.D. 338, 
343, 245 N.Y.S. 44, 50 (3d Dept. 1930), the court wrote: 
The state may unconditionally convey a valid title in the 
beds and waters of a navigable stream when the convey- 
ance is made for a valuable consideration, in aid of the 
development of public waters for navigation and com- 
merce or in the interests of the public, . . . but only when 
i t  does not unduly interfere with the development o f  the 
stream for navigation and commerce. (emphasis added). 
In People u. New York & Ontario Power Co., 219 A.D. 
114, 116, 219 N.Y.S. 497, 501 (3d Dept. 1927), the court wrote 
that the legislature may "grant unconditional rights in shore 
waters or in streams if such right[s]. . . will not unreasonably 
interfere with the general use and control of the public 
waters." 
In Finch, Pruyn & Co. u. State, 122 Misc. 404, 410, 203 
N.Y.S. 165, 170 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1924), reviewing the claim of a 
prescriptive easement to maintain a dam on the Hudson River 
a t  Glens Falls (deemed "navigable in fact"), the court wrote: 
"There can be no doubt it would have been entirely compe- 
tent for the Legislature a t  any time to have granted the claim- 
ant the right to maintain its dam where now located, saving to 
the public its navigable rights in the stream." (emphasis 
added). 
In Appleby u. City of New York, 235 N.Y. 351, 362, 139 
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N.E. 474, 476 (1923), reu'd on other grounds, 271 U.S. 364 
(1926), the Court of Appeals said: "But no case holds that any 
substantial interference with navigation may thus be author- 
ized [by grants of submerged lands with the right to fill]." 
In Long Sault Deu. Co. v. Kennedy, 212 N.Y. 1, 8-9, 105 
N.E. 849, 852 (1914), the court invalidated an attempt by the 
legislature to transfer away "control of navigation" a t  the 
Long Sault rapids of the St. Lawrence River, saying that, for 
such a conveyance to be valid, "[tlhe contemplated use . . . 
must be reasonable and one which can fairly be said to be for 
public benefit or not injurious to the public." Id. a t  10 (em- 
phasis added). The court added that the legislature cannot 
authorize a conveyance of the navigable portion of the river, 
"thereby parting for all time with its own power to improve 
such navigation." Id. at  10. 
See also Niagara Falls Power Co. u. Duryea, 185 Misc. 
696, 704, 57 N.Y.S.2d 777, 784-85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945). 
But cf. People u. Steeplechase Park Co., 218 N.Y. 459, 
479-80, 113 N.E. 521, 527 (1916), upholding the foreshore 
owner's right to maintain fences, barriers, platforms, pavilions 
and other structures on lands under navigable waters, where 
the court observed: "Where the state has conveyed lands 
without restriction intending to grant a fee therein for benefi- 
cial enjoyment, the title of the grantee . . . is absolute . . . . 9 9 
(emphasis added). 
4.6.4.2. Limitation: Extent of Conveyance Cannot 
Be Too Expansive - In Marba Sea Bay Corp. u. Clinton 
St. Realty Corp., 272 N.Y. 292, 5 N.E.2d 824 (1936), the court 
held that the attempted grant of practically the entire ocean 
front in Queens County was invalid. 
In Long Sault Deu. Co. u. Kennedy, 212 N.Y. 1, 8-9 
(1914), the court invalidated an attempt by the legislature to 
transfer away "control of navigation" at  the Long Sault rapids 
of the St. Lawrence River. 
In Coxe v. State, 144 N.Y. 396, 405, 39 N.E. 400, 401 
(1895), the Court of Appeals struck down an attempted trans- 
fer by the state of all non-urban wetlands around Staten Is- 
land and Long Island, stating that "to confer title to such a 
vast domain which the state held for the benefit of the public 
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[is] absolutely void . . . ." (emphasis added). 
4.6.4.3. Limitation: Intent to Cut Down Public 
Right Must Be Clear - In respect to a requirement of 
clarity of purpose to convey submerged lands free of the pub- 
lic right of passage, the court in People v. Steeplechase Park 
Co., 218 N.Y. 459, 473-74, 113 N.E. 521, 527 (1916), quoted 
with approval: "[A] legislative permission to appropriate to 
individual use a part of the jus publicum, does not, per se, 
deprive the public of a right to resume the privilege granted, 
unless it  appears that it was the intention to vest such privi- 
lege irrevocably in the licensee." (quoting Stevens v. Paterson 
& Newark R.R. Co., 34 N.J.L. 532, 548 (1869). It added in the 
particular case, however, that "[ilf it had been [the govern- 
ment officers'] intention to reserve to the public a right of 
passage over the lands included in the grant, they would have 
provided therefor." Id. a t  469 and "a grant for 'beneficial en- 
joyment' to a grantee, his heirs and assigns, imports a fee . . . 
." Id. a t  -472. (emphasis added). 
In New York Power & Light Corp. v. State, 230 A.D. 338, 
342, 245 N.Y.S. 44, 50-51 (3d Dept. 1930), the court wrote: 
"Grants of gift . . . are conditional grants and are made sub- 
ject to the paramount right of the state to improve the stream 
. . . [and] they will be construed against the grantee and, when 
they contain no words excluding the governmental control of 
the waters, they are subject to the jus publicum." 
In Langdon u. Mayor, 93 N.Y. 129, 148 (1883), in uphold- 
ing a grant of lands under tidal waters with the right to fill in 
derogation of the public's right, the court described the appli- 
cable distinction as follows: "[A111 grants by the sovereign of 
exclusive privileges and franchises, and all gratuitous grants of 
land should be strictly construed against the grantee; but . . . 
the same strict rule of construction should not be applied to 
grants of land made for a valuable consideration . . . ." (em- 
phasis added). 
In People v. New York & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 
N.Y. 71, 77 (1877), in which the court declared a pier over 
privately owned navigable waters to be a purpresture, it was 
said that, while the legislature may authorize a use of tidewa- 
ters inconsistent with the public right, the person claiming 
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such must show a clear title. 
It will not be presumed that the legislature intended to 
destroy or abridge the public right for private benefit, and 
words of doubtful or equivocal import will not work this 
consequence. Public grants . . . in impairment of public 
interests are construed strictly against the grantee. . . 
[H]e must be able to show a clear warrant of law to sup- 
port his claim. 
Id. (emphasis added). (Note: In Langdon u. Mayor, 93 N.Y. 
129, 145-48 (1883), the court limited this rule of strict con- 
struction to gratuitous conveyances. See above.) 
In Lansing u. Smith, 4 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1829), it was' indi- 
cated that, in a grant by the state of underwater lands with- 
out consideration; .it being in derogation of the rights of the 
public, nothing would be implied. 
See also City of Geneva u. Henson, 140 A.D. 49, 53, 124 
N.Y.S. 588, 591-92 (1910) (conveyance of the bed of Seneca 
Lake by New York State to Massachusetts would require ex- 
press language in the grant.) 
4.6.4.4. Judicial Review may be Limited - In Wa- 
terford Elec. Light, Heat & Power Co. v. State, 208 A.D. 273, 
284-85, 203 N.Y.S. 858, 870 (3d Dept. 1924), aff'd, 239 N.Y. 
629, 147 N.E. 225 (1925) (Hudson a t  Van Schoenhoven 
rapids), the court recognized that the state could release the 
public "easement of passage" or grant a "right to defeat or 
diminish the public use," subject to limitations. But in regard 
to judicial review, it quoted with approval: "It is primarily for 
the Legislature, and not for the courts, to determine between 
the conflicting interests and the necessity of requiring the 
navigation right to yield, and its discretion willnot be inter- 
fered with by the courts, except in cases of plain and gross 
abuse of discretion." Despite this disclaimer of judicial review 
authority, it went on to hold that the particular legislative 
grant at  issue was valid, on the stated ground that "it could 
not materially affect navigation." Id. a t  286. 
In James Frazee Milling Co. u. State, 122 Misc. 545, 549, 
204 N.Y.S. 645, 649 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1924) (Seneca River), the 
Heinonline - -  6 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 547 1988-1989 
548 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6 
court stated that the Legislature could "authorize a use [of 
navigable rivers] inconsistent with the public right, or inter- 
fere with the right of navigation, so far as the public is con- 
cerned, when acting in the public interest." But, the court 
added, "[wlhether a grant or privilege is in the public interest 
is for the sole determination of the Legislature." Id. (empha- 
sis added). 
In upholding the destruction, on authority from the Leg- 
islature, of a riparian owner's access by navigation over a por- 
tion of the Hudson River (subject to the tides), the court in 
Gould u. Hudson River R.R., 6 N.Y. 523, 543 (1852), asked: 
"Who is to judge of the necessity for such destruction, except 
the sovereign power, acting through the legislature which rep- 
resents it? . . . [If not the legislature], a lawsuit would be the 
certain consequence of every exercise of this right by the sov- 
ereign power." 
4.6.5. Destruction of the Public 'Right of Passage 
by Adverse Possession - The general limitation on ac- 
quiring a private title to state lands by adverse possession is 
that "no time . . . can run against the state as to property 
which it could not grant to private individuals, such as forest 
lands set aside for a park." Hinkley u. State, 234 N.Y. 309, 
315, 137 N.E. 599, 601 (1922). However, the state clearly can 
convey lands under navigable waters free of the public naviga- 
tion easement tius publicum). See 4.6.1. Thus, i t  should be a t  
least theoretically possible for title free of the jus publicum to 
be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. 
I t  should be recalled, however, that there are legal limita- 
tions on the state's power to grant the jus publicum, uiz. there 
can be no substantial interference with navigation as a result 
and the grant cannot be too expansive. See supra $ 4.6.4. No 
prescriptive right should be allowed to cut down the jus pub- 
licum if it would have been unlawful for the state to actually 
grant the claimed prescriptive right. The Court of Appeals has 
implicitly acknowledged the relevance of .such limitations to 
the adverse possession context when it specifically considered 
the effects on navigation in upholding adverse possession title 
to a small streambed in the System Properties case, infra. 
In People u. System Properties, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 330, 342, 
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141 N.E.2d 429, 434, 160 N.Y.S.2d 859, 866 (1957), the Court 
of Appeals observed: "Whether title by adverse possession can 
ever be successfully claimed as to lands actually held in trust 
by the State and appropriated to public uses by the State 
seems never to have been flatly decided by the New York ap- 
pellate courts." The court then held that a private owner of a 
dam on a state-owned streambed had, in that case, acquired 
title to the streambed by adverse possession. The court made 
clear, however, that "the dam standing on this rocky ledge in 
the river is at  a place where its existence . . . interferes with 
no public use." Id. 
The Court of Appeals also noted that, in other situations 
"a grant to a private individual may not be presumed or ad- 
verse possession adjudicated as to lands theretofore appropri- 
ated to a public use by the state since such lands are inaliena- 
ble. Id. quoting Burbank v. Fay, 65 N.Y. 57, 66 et seq. (1875)). 
In New York Power & Light Corp. v. State, 230 A.D. 338, 
343, 245 N.Y.S. 44, 50-51 (3d Dept. 1930), the court wrote: 
The state may unconditionally convey a valid title in the 
beds and waters of a navigable stream when the convey- 
ance is made for a valuable consideration, in aid of the 
development of public waters for navigation and com- 
merce or in the interests of the public, . . . but only when 
it does not unduly interfere with the development of the 
stream for navigation and commerce. Beyond this the 
control of the navigable waters . . . can never be validly 
conveyed or lost. (emphasis added). 
The court added that "[glrants of gift . . . are conditional 
grants and are made subject to the paramount right of the 
state to improve the stream . . . [and] they will be construed 
against the grantee and, when they contain no words exclud- 
ing the governmental control of the waters, they are subject to 
the jus publicum." Id. These principles of construction, when 
a grantee cannot show that a valuable consideration was paid, 
would place a heavy burden upon anyone attempting to assert 
that the jus publicum was extinguished by prescription or ad- 
verse possession. 
In People u. New York & Ontario Power Co., 219 A.D. 
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114, 117,219 N.Y.S. 497, 502 (3d Dept. 1927), the court wrote: 
"Rights in the stream which would deprive the State of its 
power to improve it for navigation may not be acquired by 
adverse possession since the State could not make such a 
grant." 
In Finch Pruyn & Co. v. State, 122 Misc. 404, 409, 203 
N.Y.S. 165, 170 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1924), the court considered the 
issue of whether the private claimant could have acquired a 
prescriptive easement to maintain its dam on the Hudson 
River a t  Glens Falls (deemed "navigable in fact"). The court 
concluded that the claimant had acquired a prescriptive ease- 
ment in the stream despite the rule that "no prescriptive right 
can be sustained, when the presumed grant upon which such 
right is based would, if made, be unlawful." 
The court in Finch Pruyn reasoned that "it would have 
been entirely competent for the Legislature at  any time to 
have granted the claimant the right to maintain its dam where 
now located, saving to the public its navigable rights in the 
stream." Id. at  410, 203 N.Y.S. at  170 (emphasis added). 
There was no interference with navigation because, at  the par- 
ticular point, the river "cannot be navigated by boats." 122 
Misc. at  403, 203 N.Y.S. a t  169. Therefore, the court con- 
cluded, "an easement [to maintain the dam] in the bed of a 
navigable stream may be acquired by prescription by a private 
individual or corporation against the state, provided such 
easement does not interfere with navigation, and could other- 
wise have been the subject of a lawful grant." 122 Misc. at  
411, 203 N.Y.S. at  171. (emphasis added). - 
In People u. Baldwin, 197 A.D. 285, 288, 188 N.Y.S. 542, 
544 (3d Dept. 1921), aff'd, 233 N.Y. 672 (1922), the court 
wrote as dictum that the state "cannot lose such lands as it 
holds for the public, in trust, for a public purpose, as high- 
ways, public streams, canals, public fair grounds." (emphasis 
added). 
In Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. New York, 200 
N.Y. 400, 421, 94 N.E. 199, 205 (1911), it was observed that 
"no lapse of time will furnish a defense to an encroachment 
on a public right," but it nevertheless upheld a prescriptive 
claim to state lands on the grounds that "such possession and 
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right were not inconsistent with the public right of ease- 
ment." Id. at  420, 94 N.E. 205. (emphasis added). 
In Burbank u. Fay, 65 N.Y. 57,67 (1875), the court stated 
that: 
Where no express grant can be allowed, the law will not 
resort to the fiction of an implied grant so as to create a 
prescriptive right . . . . The principles thus laid down as to 
highways on the land, are plainly applicable to navigable 
waters. In the case of a river which was a public highway, 
twenty years' enjoyment of the water is not conclusive as 
to the right. And if a river ever has been a public high- 
way, even if it should not be used as such for the period 
of twenty years, and during that time has been in a condi- 
tion inconsistent with its use as a public highway, the 
public right is not extinguished if i t  existed previously to 
that time. 
By analogy, the court rejected a claim to prescriptive rights in 
a public canal which, if allowed, "might impair or wholly de- 
stroy the use of the canal as a great public highway." Id. a t  72. 
See also: 
Romart Properties, Inc. u. City of New Rochelle, aff'd, 40 
A.D.2d 987, 338 N.Y.S.2d 247 (2d Dept. 1972) (title with right 
to fill the tidal Titus Mill Pond in New Rochelle based on 
"almost 250 years of adverse possession"). 
People u. New York and Ontario P. Co., 219 A.D. 114, 
117, 219 N.Y.S. 497, 502 (3d Dept. 1927): "Rights in the 
stream that would deprive the State of its power to improve it 
for navigation may not be acquired by adverse possession be- 
cause the State could not make such a grant." 
Timpson u. Mayor, 5 A.D. 424, 429, 39 N.Y.S. 248, 252 
(4th Dept. 1896): "Title to land under a navigable river . . . 
may be acquired by adverse possession or prescription against 
the State . . . . What may not be acquired is the right to inter- 
fere with the public right of navigation." 
Commissioners of the Canal Fund u. Kempshall, 26 
Wend. 404, 421 (N.Y. 1841) (implying that title by adverse 
possession to the bed of the Genesee River would, like title by 
grant, be subject to the public right of passage). 
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Cf. Bonert v. White, 6 A.D.2d 881, 882, 177 N.Y.S.2d 
658, 659-60 (2d Dept. 1958), modified, 7 A.D.2d 748, 181 
N.Y.S.2d 763 (2d Dept. 1958), afd, 9 N.Y.2d 956, 176 N.E.2d 
202, 217 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1961): "Title to the soil of a [dry-land] 
highway may be obtained by adverse possession, even though 
it is impossible either by grant or by prescription to acquire 
the public's right of passage and repassage." (citations omit- 
ted) (citing waterway cases). 
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Chapter V. 
REMEDIES FOR INTERFERENCE WITH 
THE PUBLIC RIGHT OF PASSAGE 
5. Remedies for Interference with the Public 
Right of Passage - I t  is considered a public nuisance for 
private persons to obstruct, annoy or interfere with the public 
right of passage on a privately-owned navigable stream. As a 
general matter, public nuisances are actionable only by the 
state. A private person who seeks to abate or redress a public 
nuisance must be able to prove that he or she has sustained 
"special damage" from the nuisance. 
5.1 The English Background - According to Lord 
Hale, under the English common law: 
[Plart of the king's jurisdiction in reformation of nui- 
sances is to reform and punish nuisances in all rivers, 
whether fresh or salt, that are a common passage not only 
for ships and greater vessels, but also of smaller as barges 
and boats, to reform the obstructions or annoyances that 
are therein to such common passage for as t he  common 
highways on land are for the common-land passage, so 
these kind of rivers, whether fresh or salt, that  bear 
boats or barges are highways by water. . . [A111 nuisances 
and impediments of passages of boats and vessels, though 
in the private soil of any person, may be punished by in- 
dictments, and removed. 
Hargrave's Hale, De Jure Maris, ch. 11 and 111, quoted in 
Smith v. City of Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463, 478 (1883) (emphasis 
added) (Hemlock Lake). The court also stated that the doc- 
trines of Hale's Treatise "have been frequently cited with ap- 
proval in our reports and are now indisputable." Id. 
5.2. The New York Cases - In Van Cortlandt v. 
New York Cent. R.R., 265 N.Y. 249, 262-63, 192 N.E. 401, 406 
(1934) (Croton River), the court noted a limitation on the 
public's right to intervene in order to preserve the public's 
right of passage: "Special damage must be proved resulting 
from the public nuisance before relief will be afforded to a 
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plaintiff. . . ." Id. at  262, 192 N.E. at  406. "Even an unlawful 
obstruction may not be abated as a nuisance a t  the suit of 
private persons if the State does not complain, and there is no 
showing of special damage by the champions of the public 
right." Id. a t  263, 192 N.E. at  406 (Quoting People ex rel. Le- 
high Valley Ry. Co. u. State Tax Comm'r, 247 N.Y. 9, 16, 159 
N.E. 703, 707). 
In Knickerbocker Ice Co. u. Shultz, 116 N.Y. 382, 387, 22 
N.E. 564, 565 (1889), the court wrote: 
The rights to navigate the public waters and to fish 
therein are public rights belonging to the People a t  large . 
. . . The riparian owner cannot interfere with such user by 
the public. Should he attempt to appropriate to his own 
use the lands under water in front of his premises, and to 
that end should build thereon, it would constitute a pur- 
presture which the state could remove. (citation omitted). 
But in Knickerbocker, 
. . the plaintiff could not maintain an action for its abate- 
ment. A purpresture is an invasion of the right of prop- $ 
erty in the soil while the same remains in the People. A 
nuisance in such a case as this must be an injury to the 
common right of the public to navigate the waters. [cita- 
tion omitted] And these questions can only be tested in 
an action a t  the suit of the People. 
Id. a t  389, 22 N.E. at  565 (citations omitted). 
In In  Re CommJrs of State Reservation, 37 Hun. 537, 550 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1885), the court stated: "A public nuisance is . 
an injury to the jus publicum . . . ." It held, however, that a 
dam is not a public nuisance if, a t  the particular location, the 
river cannot be navigated anyway. 
In Morgan v. King, 35 N.Y. 454, 455 (1866), an action by 
lower riparian owners for obstruction of the Racquette River, 
the court said that if the river was, "of public right, a common 
highway, at  the point where its waters are obstructed by the 
defendants' dam . . . they are liable for detaining the plain- 
tiffs logs in their passage down stream." (The Racquette was, 
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however, found not to be a public highway a t  the relevant 
point.) 
In People u. Vanderbilt, 26 N.Y. 287, 293 (1863), an ac- 
tion to remove an obstruction to navigation in the (tidal) 
Hudson River, the court made the following distinction: 
A purpresture is an invasion of the right of property in 
the soil, while the same remains in the king or the people. 
A nuisance is an injury to the jus publicum, or common 
right of the public to navigate the waters . . . If the injury 
complained of be a purpresture, it may be abated and re- 
moved at suit of the attorney-general . . . irrespective of 
any damage which may accrue. But where the action is to 
remove a nuisance, which is not shown to be a purpres- 
ture, a nuisance in fact must in all cases be shown to 
exist. 
In Ex parte Jennings, 6 Cow. 513, 528 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1826), the court wrote: "If [a riparian owner] make any erec- 
tion rendering the passage of boats, etc., inconvenient or un- 
safe, he is guilty of a nuisance." [Quoted in Chenango Bridge 
Co. u. Paige, 83 N.Y. 178, 185 (1880) and Smith u. Rochester, 
92 N.Y. 463, 484 (1883).] 
In Palmer u. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 307, 319 (1805), Chancel- 
lor Kent wrote: "The Hudson a t  Stillwater is capable of being 
held and enjoyed as private property, but it is, notwithstand- 
ing, to be deemed a public highway for public uses, such as 
that of rafting lumber . . . . To obstruct this or any other uses 
of the river, by dams &c., would be a nuisance . . . ." (empha- 
sis in original). 
Cf. People u. System Properties, 2 N.Y.2d 330, 345, 141 
N.E.2d 429, 435-36, 160 N.Y.S.2d 859, 868 (1957), in which 
the Court of Appeals considered the right of private claimants 
to have a dam removed as a "nuisance". The court wrote that 
the claimants "would have no absolute right to a mandatory 
injunction against the dam. Denial thereof would be discre- 
tionary with the court." (citation omitted). 
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Stiles u. Hooker, 7 Cow. 266, 268 (1827). (When sued for 
injuries to plaintiffs claim, defendant cannot raise the argu- 
ment that the plaintiffs claim is a public nuisance as a 
defense.) 
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Chapter VI. 
"TAKINGS" IMPLICATIONS 
6. "Takings" Implications of Legislation Relating 
to the Public Right of Passage - The cases make clear 
that a compensable taking occurs only if the effect of a legisla- 
tive enactment is to impose some new legal burden on land- 
owners. Indeed, under the so-called police power to regulate 
property uses, even new legal burdens can be imposed, so long 
as the economic impact on landowners is comparatively insub- 
stantial. No compensation is required in any event, however, 
if the Legislature merely reaffirms or ratifies existing legal 
burdens on the land. 
Legislative enactments dealing with the public right of 
passage may raise "takings" or just-compensation issues of 
two distinct kinds: 
1.Would a compensable taking occur if the Legislature 
declares a public right of passage to exist on streams or 
other water bodies which were not previously subject to 
the common-law public right of passage? 
Answer: yes, according to several New York cases. See infra § 
6.2.2. The reason is that declaring a public right to use new 
streams, not "navigable in fact" at  common law, would impose 
new legal servitudes on landowners. This point is a bit tricky, 
however, because the common law is itself not static. In par- 
ticular, its definitions of "navigable in fact" have been ex- 
panded somewhat over the years. See supra §§ 2.3.1. and 
2.4.3. Moreover, changes in customary uses, modes of trans- 
port and boating technology may also affect the usability of 
particu1a.r streams for navigation and, hence, their navigabil- 
ity in fact. With these qualifications, however, the answer to 
the first question is generally yes. 
2.What would be the takings implications of legislation 
giving boaters a right to make minimal necessary use of 
the bottoms and shores of "navigable in fact" streams, 
i.e., uses that are inseparable from safe passage itself? 
Answer: None, for two reasons. 
First, despite the absence of direct holdings, the cases are 
Heinonline - -  6 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 557 1 9 8 8 - 1 9 8 9  
558 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6 
solidly consistent with the view that the common-law public 
right of passage has always included a right to do that which 
is reasonably necessary to accomplish passage, including mini- 
mum-impact excursions on shore as necessary to safely pass 
by obstacles to navigation. See supra 5 4.5. 
Second, even if on-shore ancillary rights were not deemed 
part of the common-law right of passage, both the federal and 
state cases recognize that the Legislature can create such 
rights as an exercise of the police power, provided that the 
interference with private owners' "investment-backed expec- 
tations" is transitory and minimal. See infra $ 5  6.2 and 6.3. 
In questions of takings, both federal and state constitu- 
tional principles must be considered. See infra 5 6.2. 
6.1. Federal Constitutional Considerations - The 
United States Supreme Court has held that a private land- 
owner's right to exclude others is "universally held to be a 
fundamental element of the property right." Kaiser Aetna u. 
United States, 444 U.S. 1'64, 179-80 (1979). With that in 
mind, the Court in Kaiser Aetna struck down an attempt by 
the federal government to extend the federal navigation servi- 
tude to a previously non-navigable pond (which the owner 
had dredged and connected with the sea). 
I t  is not, however, every government impingement on the 
owner's "right to exclude" that results in a compensable tak- 
ing. Only a' few months after Kaiser Aetna, for example, the 
Supreme Court upheld a state law which required shopping 
center owners to permit demonstrators into the shopping 
center in order to express their views. PruneYard Shopping 
Center u. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). Acknowledging that 
even a property right so fundamental as the right to exclude 
others can be subjected to modification, one of the justice's 
observed that if "common law rights were . . . immune from 
revision . . . [it] would freeze the common law as it has been 
constructed by the courts, perhaps a t  its 19th century state of 
development." Id. a t  93 (Marshall, J. concurring). 
The Supreme Court's main opinion in the PruneYard 
case stated that the Kaiser Aetna case was "quite different". 
Of Kaiser Aetna, the Court wrote, the private owners "had 
invested substantial amounts of money in dredging the pond, 
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developing it into an exclusive marina [which was to be] open 
only to fee-paying members, and the fees were paid in part to 
'maintain the privacy and security of the pond.' " 447 U.S. at  
84 (quoting Kaiser v. Aetna, 444 U.S. a t  168. (emphasis 
added)). The government's attempt to exploit the product of 
these expenditures without payment "interfered with Kaiser 
Aetna's 'reasonable investment backed expectations."' Id. 
(emphasis added). By contrast, in the shopping center case, 
the private owners "failed to demonstrate that the 'right to 
exclude others' is so essential to the use or economic value of 
their property that the state-authorized limitation of it 
amounted to a 'taking.' " Id. (emphasis added). 
All in all, the facts of the PruneYard (shopping center) 
case appear to be far closer to the "takings" questions a t  hand 
than the facts of Kaiser Aetna. The average stream-side 
owner has neither invested in waterway improvements (such 
as the dredging in Kaiser Aetna) nor created any other amen- 
ity which passage and its incidents need utilize. In Kaiser 
Aetna, the government was, in effect, trying to capture a pri- 
vately created facility and give it to the public, thereby de- 
priving the owner of its expected reward. By contrast, the av- 
erage stream-side owner's only investment that is touched 
upon in passage is the investment in the landbase itself, the 
same as in PruneYard. Also like PruneYard, and unlike Kai- 
ser Aetna, the minimum shore use incidental to passage 
would have only a negligible economic impact on the 
landowner. 
In sum, the federal constitutional case law clearly permits 
state legislation to authorize minimal, transitory, low-impact 
use by the public of private land. The conclusion follows that 
the United States Constitution would not prevent inclusion of 
minimal bottom and shore use as part of a legislative public 
right of passage, even if such uses were to be considered a 
new, albeit insubstantial, legal burden on riparian landowners. 
6.2. New York Takings Cases - More than a cen- 
tury before the Kaiser Aetna decision, the New York Court of 
Appeals held that the Legislature cannot ipse dixit declare 
streams to be public highways if they previously were not, ex- 
cept on payment of just compensation. Morgan v. King, 35 
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N.Y. 454 (1866). If the state's just compensation requirement 
is more stringent than the federal constitutional requirement, 
the state's requirement controls: "The courts of this State 
have determined these rules of property [in streams] and have 
decided what the State must pay, and when, in the instances 
of its seizure of water power rights for purposes of navigation. 
In these questions the United States has no concern." Water- 
ford Elec. Light, Heat & Power Co. v. State, 208 A.D. 273, 
288, 203 N.Y.S. 858, 873 (3d Dept. 1924), aff'd, 239 N.Y. 629, 
147 N.E. 225 (1925) (taking water power Hudson a t  Van 
Schoenhoven rapids: compensable). In other words, if New 
York's common law public right of passage is less extensive 
than the federal navigation servitude, the state may have to 
pay just compensation for a given imposition on private own- 
ers even though the Federal government would not. Accord 
Appleby u. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 399-400 (1926). 
Based on the New York cases, it is clear that no taking 
occurs when the Legislature merely declares or asserts state 
authority over a stream that is "navigable in fact", unless the 
jus publicum has been previously conveyed. See infra. I t  is 
equally clear that the Legislature cannot extend the public 
right of passage to streams not covered by the common law 
public right without paying just compensation. 
The New York cases provide no direct insight on the 
"takings" implications of legislation declaring that the public 
right of passage includes necessary incidental uses of stream 
bottoms and adjacent shorelands. There is, however, no rea- 
son to assume that the New York constitutional law is differ- 
ent from the federal constitutional law on this point. See 
supra 5 6.1. Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals is, if any- 
thing, even more willing than the U.S. Supreme Court to up- 
hold legislation authorizing small scale, low-impact physical 
utilization of private land. A forced easement for cable TV 
lines upheld under the police power "in view of the minimal 
nature of the invasion and the absence of any reasonable ex- 
pectation . . . that the space thus utilized (or invaded) would 
ever be income productive." Loretto u. Teleprompter Man- 
hattan CATV Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 124, 155,423 N.E.2d 320,336, 
440 N.Y.S.2d 843, 859 (1981), reu'd, 458 U.S. 419 (1982). The 
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New York cases do not provide any reason to  believe that  a 
new legal burden on landowners would be created by legisla- 
tive authorization of incidental use as is necessary to  accom- 
plish safe passage. See supra 5 4.5. 
6.2.1. If State Acting Within its Navigation Pow- 
ers: No Taking - 
The doctrine must be regarded as settled that whatever 
the rights of the owners of lands bordering upon, or 
within the waters of, a navigable river, they must yield 
when the powers of government are called into exercise 
for a general public benefit in the improvement of naviga- 
tion. . . . [The individual] can have no private rights in 
the river, which are exempt from the requirements of a 
public or governmental necessity. 
Slingerland u. International Contr. Co., 169 N.Y. 60, 70, 61 
N.E. 995, 997 (1901). 
"[Wlhen [gratuitous grants from the state] contain no 
words excluding the governmental control of the waters, they 
are subject to  the jus publicum. When the state assumes con- 
trol of the stream . . . i t  does not take property within the 
meaning the Constitution." New York Power & Light Corp. u. 
State, 230 A.D. 338,343, 245 N.Y.S. 44, 50-51 (3d Dept. 1930) 
(Mohawk River). 
"The Legislature, except under the  power of eminent do- 
main, upon making compensation, can interfere with such 
streams only for the purpose of regulating, preserving, and 
protecting the public easement." People ex rel. New York, 0. 
& W. Ry. u. Sta te  Tax Comm'n, 116 Misc. 774, 776, 191 
N.Y.S. 464, 466 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921) (analogizing the Susque- 
hanna River with the Chenango River, "a fresh-water stream . 
. . [and] therefore a private river." Id.). 
The proprietary interest of the riparian owner is 
subordinate to the public easement of passage and . . . the 
legislature may direct the performance of acts by state of- 
ficers, which tend to promote the public right of passage 
and transportation, without subjecting the state to liabil- 
ity. When, however, . . . land is taken and the river waters 
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are diverted for the purpose of constructing and operating 
some other channel distinct from that of the river [uiz. a 
canal], then the limit of the state's [navigation-easement] 
authority . . . has been reached. 
Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. u. New York, 200 N.Y. 400, 
418, 94 N.E. 199, 204 (1911) (rejected the state's argument 
that i t  was not liable for damages to  riparian owners when it 
appropriated streambed and waters in building a separate 
canal.) 
In Chenango Bridge Co. u. Paige, 83 N.Y. 178, 185 (1880), 
after first referring to  the Chenango River as the "private 
property of the riparian owners," the Court of Appeals said: 
"The Legislature, except under the power of eminent domain, 
upon making compensation, can interfere with such streams 
only for purpose of regulating, preserving and protecting the 
public easement." (Quoted in Smith u. Rochester, 92 N.Y. 
463, 485 (1883)). 
6.2.2. Stream Must Be Navigable in Fact, or Else 
a Taking Results - 
The rule is that a state Legislature has the power to ap- 
propriate by force of its own enactment any flowing 
stream to the use of the public as a highway, subject, 
however, to the qualification that if a stream is not in fact 
navigable, a statute declaring it to be navigable will not 
make it so in law as against the pre-existing rights of ri- 
parian owners, unless compensation is made to such own- 
ers for the value of the rights so destroyed or injured. 
People ex rel. New York, 0. & W. Ry. u. Sta te  Tax Comm'n, 
116 Misc. 774, 778, 191 N.Y.S. 464, 468 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921) 
(citation omitted) (Susquehanna River). 
The statutes declaring the Genesee river navigable were 
enacted after the State had parted by grant with the title 
to the shores and bed of the river. (citation omitted) The 
State could not by means of such statutes diminish or de- 
stroy without compensation rights of property of the ripa- 
rian owners derived from such grant (citation omitted). 
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People ex rel. Western New York & P. Ry u. State Tax 
Comm'n, 244 N.Y. 596, 597, 155 N.E. 911, 912 (1927). 
In Morgan u. King, 35 N.Y. 454, 457 (1866), in relation to 
a statute declaring the Racquette River to be a "public high- 
way", the court wrote: 
[I]t does not provide compensation for. taking private 
property of the owners of the banks and the bed of the 
stream. If, prior to the passage of the act, the stream was 
private, in use as in property, the legislature could not 
take away the rights of those who were then riparian 
owners, nor subject such rights to public use, created or 
authorized by the act itself, without compensation. (em- 
phasis added). 
In Brown u. Scofield, 8 Barb. 239, 242 (Sup. Gen. T. 
1850), an action for obstructing a public river with a dam, the 
court rejected a takings challenge against a statute which de- 
clared the Canisteo River to be a public highway, saying: "The 
statute did not create the [public] right; it only declared what 
existed before, and by common law. There was no attempt 
made, on the trial, to dispute the right of the public to use the 
river as a highway a t  common law." 
But cf.: 
Curtis u. Keesler, 14 Barb. 511, 519 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1852), 
it was stated that there was a public right of passage on the 
Delaware River bounding Sullivan County and on the 
Beaverkill, despite the fact that neither was capable of float- 
ing boats, rafts or logs "unless swelled by freshets", on the 
grounds that "those streams have been declared public high- 
ways by statute." The suggestion, at  least, is that a statutory 
declaration that a stream is a public highway may not neces- 
sarily run afoul of the just compensation requirement. 
On the effect of a legislative declaration that certain 
stream and lake waters are "public highways for the purpose 
of floating logs, timber and lumber down those streams," the 
court in Brant Lake Shores, Inc. u. Barton, 61 Misc. 2d 902, 
907, 307 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970), said "[nlor 
does [the enactment]. . . give anyone a greater right to the use 
of the waters of Brant Lake than one had prior to such 
Heinonline - -  6 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 563 1988-1989 
564 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REV1E.W [Vol. 6 
designation." 
Other Cases: 
Langdon u. Mayor, 93 N.Y. 129, 161 (1883) (grant of 
wharfage could not be destroyed by cutting off wharf owner's 
water access to the sea without compensation). 
6.2.3. If State Has Conveyed the Jus Publicurn: 
Taking Results - In Appleby u. City of New York, 271 
U.S. 364, 399 (1926), the Supreme Court said that, once the 
jus publicum has been conveyed, "the city [or state] can only 
be revested with them by a condemnation of the rights 
granted." Thus, the city, having conveyed the underwater 
lands with right to fill, could not now dredge the lands in aid 
of navigation under the jus publicum. 
In First Constr. Co. of Brooklyn u. State, 221 N.Y. 295, 
316, 116 N.E. 1020, 1026 (1917), an action for just compensa- 
tion for a taking of lands under tidal waters of Gowanus Bay, 
the court wrote: "[Aln act granting the right to fill in lands 
under water, and thereby acquire title to the same, gives an 
inchoate, vested interest in the lands described which is a 
property right and . . . the grantee cannot be deprived without 
compensation." 
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